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The paper analyzes new data on the incidence of poverty as a most vivid indicator of 
the social cost of the economic transformation in Russia, with an attempt to evaluate 
the suitability of available poverty measurements for identifying categories of the 
poor, and to look for relevant welfare responses to the hardships of the transition. 
Basing on a review of major trends in real incomes and inequality, relevant poverty 
thresholds and the incidence of poverty as well as regional variations in its level are 
discussed. The composition of poverty is also examined, with an aim to identify who 
the poor are in Russia as well as what are the main causes that bring them into 
poverty. Finally, analysis of major features of the Russian social security system and 
gaps in the social safety net highlights policy priorities with regard to poverty 
alleviation. The major policy options as it appears as a result of the study lie in better 
targeting of benefits on the needy groups of the population, redistribution of financial 
resources to programs of poverty relief, as well as considerable improvement in the 
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The phenomena of inequality and poverty, to which even the most prosperous 
Western societies are not immune, have acquired a particular significance in the 
former centrally-planned economies which are now undergoing an unprecedented 
transition to a market economic system. Although the existence of poverty was 
acknowledged in the former Soviet Union and other East European countries as 
the crisis in their economies intensified by the end of 1980s, the radical 
transformation initiated in the early 1990s has been associated with an heretofore 
unknown increase in inequality and poverty. A deterioration in welfare caused by 
the economic collapse was exacerbated by austerity programmes introduced to 
achieve macroeconomic stabilisation. At the same time the processes of 
privatisation, the elimination of price controls and the liberalisation of wage 
policies speeded up that of incomes differentiation, introducing sharp contrasts 
between expanding poverty, and concentrating wealth in the hands of only a few.
The severity and scope of problems related to the growth in poverty are possibly 
greatest in Russia, the largest economy in transition. The crisis of welfare here is 
complicated by the disintegration of the former Soviet Union associated with 
enormous economic and social costs. The complexity of these problems is also 
due to the large size of the country, which has extremely diverse regional 
economic and social conditions to contend with and a particularly hard situation 
in a number of large and economically depressed territories. The emergence of 
substantial poverty and the deterioration of social welfare present a serious 
challenge to the economic reforms and the process of démocratisation. To date 
there has been an insufficient policy response in this regard.
It has proved extremely difficult to combine measures of financial stabilisation 
and structural reforms with the development of new welfare institutions. The old 
social security system has been eroding at too fast a rate for it to be replaced by a 
new one. Severe budget constraints and a high rate of inflation determined the 
priorities of monetary stabilisation over social protection, and therefore did not 
allow sufficient resources to be allocated to restore adequate levels of welfare. 
Adequate social policy responses are absolutely necessary to ensure the 
continuity of transition. In addition, a considerable amount of inconsistency in 
Russian policy-making - rendered even more complex by the confused 
relationship between the federal and local governments - has frequently disrupted 
the implementation of social policies. The lack of an effective safety net capable 
of alleviating the social hardships of the transition has been an important cause of 
growing popular disappointment, despair and even giving rise to the danger of 




























































































(where the communists won a majority of votes) and the collisions in the course 
of the presidential election campaign in 1996 provided a vivid evidence of the 
gravity of political backlashes against the reforms.
Research on poverty in Russia has recently attracted considerable attention from 
Russian governmental and academic institutions, and international organisations, 
primarily the World Bank [World Bank, 1995; Milanovic, 1995]. However, various 
poverty assessments demonstrate substantial differences in approaches and findings. 
In addition, new evidence being constantly introduced by rapid social changes, along 
with the appearance of new social surveys data require further in-depth study. This 
paper analyses new available evidence with an aim aims to provide additional input 
for the understanding of the nature and dimensions of poverty in Russia as well as to 
the discussion on the available social policy solutions.
To consider policy options one needs to depart from a particular concept of poverty 
and, correspondingly, from a specific poverty line definition. This paper will not 
attempt to propose an alternative concept of poverty or to define a poverty line other 
than those currently applied in Russia. There are generally three alternative concepts 
of poverty which bear directly on practical-policy making. The first is that of 
"absolute income poverty", that is, the objective shortage of income in relation to a 
given normative threshold (the absolute poverty line) which generally allows only the 
satisfaction of basic physiological and social needs. This concept - dating as far back 
as Rowntry’s surveys of poverty in York in the end of XIX century - has been 
extensively developed by Amarithya Sen [Sen, 1985]. The practical application of the 
absolute poverty line definition was developed by Mollie Orshansky and is used by 
the USA Department of Social Security [Orshansky, 1965; 1969], The same concept 
has a practical application in Germany and Austria.
Objections to the absolute concept of poverty - most systematically expressed by 
Atkinson - point to the inadequacy of the purely biological content of the cost of 
subsistence, emphasising the role of customs and traditions in consumption patterns 
and, hence, suggesting that it is only possible to conceive of poverty as deprivation 
relative to the standards acceptable in a given society [Atkinson, 1975]. Thus the 
second concept, i.e. "relative income poverty", takes as its starting point the gap 
between an individual’s income and the prevailing income and consumption 
standards in the society, regardless of the person's absolute level of income. This 
approach derives from the work of Peter Townsend who developed this concept of 
relative deprivation for the United Kingdom [Townsend, 1979]. The relative poverty 
measurement is practised in several European countries, for instance in Italy, and 
where it is normally set at 40 to 50 per cent of the average per capita income. An 
alternative approach to overcome the shortcomings of the absolute poverty 




























































































School. This method of poverty definition is based on the self-evaluated inadequacy 
of a person's income [Haagenars and Van Praag, 1985].
Poverty research on Russia is still recent, especially that done by Russian scholars, 
and is based on whatever limited empirical evidence is available. It is fairly 
uninfluenced by theoretical approaches and is more policy-oriented. The absolute 
concept of poverty dominates efforts at empirical poverty measurement. There are no 
studies of relative deprivation in Townsend’s sense in Russia, but the relativity 
approach can be seen in attempts to define regionally specific poverty lines based on 
the account of varying territorial economic and social conditions. The subjective 
approach, aiming to ascertain the incidence of poverty, basing on people’s opinion 
about their standard of living, is also used in Russia for public opinion surveys, 
particularly by the Russian Centre for Public Opinion Research.
Poverty assessment for Russia is an enormous task, impossible to implement within 
the scope of an individual project. For the purposes of this study, official statistics 
and a number of independent surveys have been utilised. These include regular 
publications by the Russian State Committee on Statistics (Goscomstat), surveys by 
Russian Governmental institutions - the Ministry of Social Protection (MOSP) and 
the Ministry of Labour (MOL), international organisations - the World Bank, 
UNICEF and the OECD, academic research institutions, particularly the Moscow 
Institute for Economic and Social Studies of the Population (abbreviated in Russian 
as ISEPN) and the Russian Centre for Public Opinion Research (VCIOM). In 
addition to these sources of information, data collected by the author during a field 
research visit to the city of Krasnoyarsk (in Siberia) have been used for the 
assessment of regional programs of social assistance.
The analysis begins by Section 2 which considers poverty thresholds applied as 
instruments of poverty measurement in Russia. Section 3 analyses evidence on the 
incidence of poverty and regional variations in its level. The focus of Section 4 is on 
the composition of poverty, with an attempt to identify who the poor are in Russia as 
well as what the main causes are that bring them into poverty. Section 5 discusses 
gaps in the social safety net and social policy priorities with regard to poverty 
alleviation. Finally, Section 6 analyses local programs of social assistance using 





























































































2. The Poverty Line Definition
The need for adequate policy responses has stimulated considerable activity on 
poverty research in Russia. Due to the sharp fall in income and the severity of 
extreme poverty this research as well as practical policy making were mainly based 
on an approach focusing on the absolute concept of poverty rather than the concept 
of deprivation relative to the average standard of living. One of the first results of 
those efforts has been the introduction of a new poverty line - the subsistence 
minimum, which has replaced the old minimum consumption budget of pre-reform 
times. In 1991-1992 technical assistance was provided to the Russian government to 
refine the food portion of the minimal consumer basket [Popkin, Mozhina and 
Baturin, 1994], A revised food basket corresponding to the WHO and the FAO 
nutritional recommendations was subsequently adopted by the Russian Ministry of 
Labour. This basket differs for children, the able-bodied and pensioners. On average 
the subsistence minimum provided for 68.3% of individual income to be spent on 
food, which is much higher as compared to poverty lines applied in other countries. 
For pensioners this proportion was 83% of their income.
The official subsistence minimum has a number of advantages as an instrument for 
empirical poverty research. It is regularly published by the State Committee of 
Statistics (Goscomstat) with a monthly adjustment to the rate of inflation (Table 1). 
Thus it is the most easily available and convenient indicator for calculating the 
headcount poverty index, i.e. the proportion of the population below the poverty line. 
Tire latter is also regularly published by Goscomstat and is based on their monitoring 
of household incomes.1
It is important to bear in mind that poverty lines and measurement can never be 
entirely objective and value-free. The official poverty line in Russia is criticised as 
inadequate from several points of view: for instance, for being too low (with the share 
of income spent on food too high), or, on the contrary, too generous. The subsistence 
minimum was calculated as a temporary definition designed for the conditions of 
acute economic crisis. It was expected to be used for about one year to help to 
overcome the initial most difficult stage of transition. As the economic situation did 
not radically improve, the subsistence minimum remained as both a statistical and a 
political instrument for much longer. Meanwhile, the subsistence minimum allowed 
only one third of personal income to be spent on clothes, footwear, medicines and 
services, and virtually nothing on consumer durables. Of course it was absolutely 
inadequate, especially in a situation when prices for these goods were soaring. People 
affected by poverty were forced to refrain from purchases of most non-food 
consumer items. If they were able to survive through the first reform year of 1992, 
the perpetuation of such a situation through 1993-95 has made their position much 




























































































acute. Moreover, the marketisation of housing and public utilities has raised the share 
of rent as well as that of bills for water, electricity and the telephone from the earlier 
3-5 to 15-20 per cent in an average family budget, with particularly adverse effects 
on the poor. The Government’s plan is to eliminate completely housing and utility 
subsidies by 1998. The population will then have to pay the full market cost of 
housing rent and utilities.
The change in the structure of consumer prices that follows the elimination of state 
price controls necessitates a revision of the food share in the subsistence minimum 
consumer basket. The higher relative price increases for clothes, consumer durables, 
housing, utilities, transportation and services clearly reduce the share of foodstuffs in 
real consumer spending. Thus in 1995 the Ministry of Labour had to revise the share 
of food in the minimal consumer basket. The new food share has been set at 57 % 
instead of the earlier 68.3 %. This has automatically increased the current cost of the 
subsistence minimum, and, consequently the proportion of the population below the 
poverty line. Even with this, by any standard, modest minimum of subsistence, the 
population below it numbers 30 million people, making the realisation of necessary 
safety nets problematic. Therefore a group of very poor people with incomes equal to 
half of that minimum, has been identified in order to give them the most urgent 
assistance.
Another government agency, the Centre for Economic Analysis and Forecasting 
(TsEK), introduced two-level poverty lines: the physiological subsistence minimum 
(the lower limit of poverty) and the TsEK subsistence minimum (the higher limit). In 
1992-93 the physiological minimum was equal to 60-70 % of the Ministry of Labour 
subsistence minimum while the higher limit exceeded it by 10-30 %, gradually 
approaching the MOL standard. The TsEK estimates therefore do not offer any 
substantial differences or advantages for analytical or political purposes over the 
Goscomstat numbers.
An alternative approach suggested setting the food share in minimal consumer 
spending at 80 % [Mozhina et al., 1995]. For the reference group this would imply 
excluding the possibility of buying clothes, furniture or other consumer durables. 
Obviously, reaching the income level of such a poverty line by an individual or a 
family would not at all mean an end to severe deprivation for them. Nevertheless, it 
was regarded as an appropriate guideline for the conditions of acute crisis. However, 
since the economic and social situation has not radically improved for over four 
years, this poverty line -providing for 80 % of income on food - no longer offers a 
tolerable level of consumption.
Another limitation on the use of the aggregate official subsistence minimum lies in the 




























































































technique is facilitated by regionally adjusted subsistence minima which are 
estimated by the regional governments. In doing so most regions follow a uniform 
Ministry of Labour methodology which simplifies interregional comparisons. 
Nonetheless some regions (oblast), for example, Moscow, have departed from this 
recommended methodology and adopted standards that are twice as high. In the case 
of Moscow this is justified by the much higher costs of many essential goods and 
services. For instance, a monthly ticket for urban transportation (metro, buses, trams, 
etc.) costs 180,000 rubles, or 37 % of the January 1996 country-wide monthly 
subsistence minimum of 485,000 rubles). Thus for certain regions not only should the 
cost of the uniform minimal consumer basket be adjusted to local price levels; its 
composition should also be revised in accordance with specific territorial conditions. 
Another objection to the use of the subsistence minimum as an instrument of poverty 
measurement relates to the role of household assets in real consumption. It is 
understood that in the particular case of Russia money income does not give a 
complete measure of real consumption. While it is true that the majority of 
households, even those affected by poverty, have some accumulated assets which 
help them to survive, money income still seems to be an adequate indicator of current 
trends in poverty. Household assets have depreciated considerably over the past five 
years, during which time the poor have been unable to replace them. In addition, 
markets allowing those assets to be sold or leased, and thus to help a family make 
ends meet, are still underdeveloped. Savings were also wiped out by inflation unless 
people kept them at home in foreign hard currency. However until 1992 to keep 
foreign currency was illegal and also practically difficult to get and exchange, so such 
cases were relatively rare.
The above consideration is closely related to the issue of economies of scale in 
household consumption. It is widely believed that it costs less than twice as much to 
support two individuals as it does to support one. However, since the cost of 
overhead elements (such as rent, heating and so on) in the budget of poor families in 
Russia is small, neglecting economies of scale in consumption for the purposes of 
poverty research may not introduce a great distortion [McAuley, 1994, p. 33].
More important is to take into account various non-money forms of support or 
incomes from informal activities available to many families. There is good reason to 
expect that this part of real incomes is not adequately captured by statistics. To 
overcome this difficulty it would be useful to look at household expenditure as a 
measure of real consumption. Such data have become available from the Russian 
Longitudinal Monitoring Survey initiated by the World Bank. According to these 
reports household expenditure exceeds reported income, so, where possible, it would 
be useful to compare the RLMS expenditure data with the income statistics. 
Furthermore, the RLMS has examined the extent of private inter-household transfers 




























































































may be useful to make adjustments to the incidence of poverty obtained through the 
Goscomstat incomes statistics.
Dissatisfaction with the official poverty line has also stimulated attempts to design 
alternative poverty lines, some of which have been based on individuals' subjective 
measure of poverty, i.e. have been similar to the Leiden School approach [Haagenars 
and van Praag, 1985]. In Russia the subjective approach is used for surveys of public 
opinion, particularly those carried out by VCIOM (the Russian Centre for Public 
Opinion Research). The results of such surveys are heavily influenced by the specific 
situation of Russia where the average income has fallen sharply against a rapidly 
growing income disparity and the emergence of wealthy groups of the population. In 
their individual perception of a sufficient income, people naturally refer to standards 
typical of their previous rather than their current circumstances as well as to the living 
standards of the newly prosperous elites. A sensitivity analysis of this type, 
accounting for individual perception of how much income is needed to provide for a 
minimum subsistence, yields a subjective poverty line which is 1.5-2 times higher 
than the official subsistence minimum.
Where the poverty line is drawn is largely a question of policy, and for the design of 
policy responses an approach based on the official poverty line is appropriate. From a 
political perspective any decision to move the poverty line up or down, even slightly, 
would imply including or excluding a significant number of Russians from being poor 
and, hence, from being the target of social assistance. Meanwhile the proper targeting 
of the group affected by poverty - as that in most acute need of aid - is a key issue for 
the design of adequate safety nets. Drawing the poverty line too high, e.g. by 
embracing over half the population, actually means refusing to implement realistic 
poverty-relief programs. If the official poverty line is too high from the point of view 
of feasibility of social assistance, it is useful to look at that group in desperate need 
whose income is half or less than half the official subsistence minimum.
3. The Incidence of Poverty
Much evidence suggests that the incidence of poverty in Russia has increased since 
the beginning of the economic transition in 1992. However, the various approaches 
and poverty lines applied yield different estimates of the number of people affected 
by poverty. An assessment based on the official Ministry of Labour methodology 
average subsistence minimum poverty line and published by the Russian State 
Committee of Statistics (Goscomstat) offer the longest available time series (Table 
1). What is particularly interesting is to ascertain how much poverty has expanded in 



























































































The appearance of poverty in Russia is not the immediate result of the rapid 
transformation or the collapse of the centrally-planned economic system. There was 
much poverty in the Soviet Union long before this, although only in 1989 was it 
officially acknowledged by the Soviet Government. At that time 11 per cent of the 
population (meaning 16.2 million people for the Russian Federation) were reported to 
have incomes below the quasi-official minimum consumption budget of 89 rubles per 
capita a month. This measure, however, is regarded by international experts as the 
upper boundary of poverty as it provided for a relatively generous consumer basket, 
at least with regard to its food component [Braithwaite, 1994, p. 12; McAuley, 
1996], Thus in terms of money income the incidence of extreme poverty may have 
been lower than suggested by the above figure. However, money income was not a 
fully adequate measure of living standard in the pre-reform times, as in the economy 
of shortage possession of money was not sufficient to ensure access to goods and 
services. So, taking into account the unavailability of many essential goods, which 
was particularly aggravated in 1990-91, or the time and effort spent by people 
standing in queues brought down the real standard of living significantly, particularly 
for those in the lower segments of the income distribution as they were 
underprivileged not only in terms of available income.
On the other hand, money income did not include various goods and benefits 
provided in kind through the pervasive system of social services, many of which were 
offered by industrial firms, trade unions or local governments. These services ranged 
from the provision of subsidised housing and utilities, free education, health and child 
care to very cheap recreational and cultural services. Access to many of these social 
assets, as well as widespread social security benefits, for example sick pay or 
maternity allowances, and strictly observed universal guarantees for employment 
[Mikhalev, 1996], compensated significantly for difficulties encountered by 
households on low money incomes. Combined with price subsidies for essential 
goods (although by the end of 1980 s many of them had to be rationed due to 
shortages and were therefore difficult to procure) the old system of social provision 
ensured a minimum standard of living for the majority of citizens. Yet for some of 
them it was clearly very low. Thus it is very difficult to make quantitative 
assessments of the extent of poverty in Russia before the 1992 reforms, although it is 
clear that poverty began to expand well before the collapse of the Soviet Union in 
1991.
With any possible adjustments of the Goscomstat estimates of poverty prior to 1992 
their data demonstrate a marked increase in poverty later in the 1990 s, embracing 
from one quarter to one third of the population. The headcount poverty index more 
than doubled in 1992, immediately after the initiation of price liberalisation. The real 
change may have been even more profound, i.e. the expansion of poverty much 




























































































on the old minimum consumption budget which in real terms was 2.5 higher than the 
new official subsistence minimum applied from the beginning of 1992 onwards. 
According to an estimate based on the old Soviet methodology some 90 % of the 
population in 1992 had per capita monthly incomes below the poverty line of the old 
standard [McAuley, 1996]. However, the poverty line based on the old minimum 
consumption budget became irrelevant as inflation accelerated and the consumer 
price composition changed dramatically. It lost any meaning for social policy­
making, and was soon abandoned even for analytical purposes.
A further trend in the headcount poverty ratio throughout 1992-1995 is more difficult 
to ascertain due to the considerable variations caused by substantial fluctuations in 
the monthly rate of inflation. The poverty index was normally higher at the beginning 
of each year due to sharp price increases usual at this time; these decreased by 
summer, demonstrating a new increase in autumn caused by a regular autumn wave 
of inflation (Table l).2 In December the poverty rate usually reached its lowest point, 
reflecting higher incomes in that month when wage arrears, annual bonuses and 
interest earnings were paid out.
The range of fluctuations in the headcount poverty index has been as wide as 16 % 
for December 1992 to 35 % (over twice as high) in March 1993; in March 1994 the 
poverty rate decreased nearly three times (to 11 %) against 31 % in January of the 
same year. Monthly data are therefore somewhat misleading for an assessment of a 
longer-term trend. Quarterly aggregates show a still higher number for 1993 as 
compared to 1992, and a decrease in 1994 with a subsequent sharp rise in early 1995 
followed by a downward trend further throughout the year (Table 2). An estimate for 
the end of 1995 gives roughly 20 per cent of the population or about 30 million with 
incomes below the official subsistence minimum.3
It is typical of the Russian press as well as of Russian and western academic experts 
to express scepticism towards the Goscomstat numbers on the incidence of poverty. 
A common line of argument claims that the Goscomstat statistics underscore the real 
incidence of poverty at least for two reasons. Firstly, the applied minimum of 
subsistence is inadequate and needs to be adjusted to changes in consumer price 
structure, i.e. to the relative increase in the cost of essential non-food consumer goods 
and services including medicines, housing rent, utilities and transportation among 
other things, which used to occupy only a small share in a household expenditure.
Secondly, there are doubts about the representativeness of the sample of the family 
budget survey from which the Goscomstat derives its estimates. It is alleged that the 
sampling frame and the methods through which the sample was drawn biased the 
average income upwards. Such a bias originates from a disproportionate inclusion of 




























































































where the highest quintile of the income distribution receives half of all income, two 
thirds of that amount going to the top 10 per cent of income earners, the average per 
capita income does not correspond to a real living standard of the majority. If the top 
20 per cent of incomes were excluded from the sample, the average income of the 
remaining 80 per cent would be 1.5 times lower. This consideration, however, is only 
relevant to the ratio of the incomes of the poor to the average per capita income, 
implying that the real median income groups of the population are poorer than shown 
by statistics. The absolute number of people on income below a certain fixed amount, 
in our case the MOL subsistence minimum, is still the same, so the above argument 
cannot call into question the Goscomstat numbers of the poverty rate.
Another common argument against the subsistence minimum on which the 
Goscomstat bases its headcount poverty index is that it contrasts sharply with the 
population’s perception of how much income a family needs to live on. Respondents 
in the Russian Centre for Public Opinion Research (VCIOM) June 1995 survey4 
suggested an amount of 367.000 rubles a month (US $ 80.9 at the prevailing 
exchange rate), i.e. 1.5 times higher than the official poverty line of 277.000 rubles 
(US $ 61).5 In June 1994 the same difference was more than twice (194.000 rubles 
against 92.000 rubles) [World Bank, 1995, p. 18]. These subjective estimate-based 
poverty rates are therefore much higher than the Goscomstat indexes. Basing on nine 
surveys by VCIOM realised in 1993, Tatyana Zaslavskaya estimated the incidence of 
poverty in Russia as high as 54 per cent of the population [VCIOM, 1994, 2, p. 5.]. 
A later study by VCIOM in 1994 revealed 58 per cent of respondents in the sample 
living in conditions of poverty [VCIOM, 1994, 4, p. 25.]. A 1995 VCIOM survey 
yielded a number exceeding 80 % of the population.6 Although useful for a general 
assessment of the social situation, such estimations cannot provide a meaningful 
guide for social policy-making.
An opposite line of criticism against the Goscomstat estimates of the poverty rate 
maintains that the family budget survey on which those calculations are made do not 
fully account for the supplementary incomes available to households, or that they 
underestimate economies of scale in household consumption. Survey data reveal that 
only about one in five Russian households rely solely upon the wage at the main job 
or on transfers received from the system of social protection. Over 80 per cent of 
families undertake additional activities to improve their well-being. A 1994 survey 
'Family and Society’ carried out by the Research Institute on Family, the Ministry of 
Social Protection and the Russian Peace Fund revealed that only 17.6 per cent of 
Russian families do not undertake any additional activities to earn a supplementary 
income; 12.6 of respondents had a permanent second job, 23.4 per cent took on 
occasional supplementary jobs, 35.7 per cent sought various forms of self­




























































































These subsidiary incomes are not properly accounted for by the Goscomstat in the 
family budget survey.
It is worth mentioning, however, that, as becomes clear from the above data, a stable 
source of secondary income is still available to a minority. Most activities in the 
informal sector represent poorly remunerated jobs located mainly in the service 
sector. Only for 7 % of respondents with a second job in VCIOM survey did it 
provide more than half of the household income [World Bank, 1995, p. 29], while in 
6 % of the poor households the breadwinner worked at two jobs still being unable to 
raise his family income above the poverty line [VCIOM, 1994, No. 4 p. 25], For 
poorer households it is more typical to rely on various forms of self-support in kind, 
which may alleviate rather than radically improve their position.
According to the Russian Longitudinal Monitoring Survey (RLMS),8 even with 
access to a private plot a household is only 7.3 per cent less likely to be poor, which 
implies that for an absolute majority home food production cannot offer a way out of 
poverty [World Bank, 1995, p. 32]. A survey by the Moscow Institute of Socio- 
Economic Studies of the Population (abbreviated in Russian as ISEPN) conducted in 
1992 in four Russian cities found out that for an average household in an urban area, 
where live three in four Russians, income gained form a country plot in kind forms 
only 4.3 % of the family income [Mozhina et al., 1994, p. 18], For the majority these 
recently acquired tiny plots of 600 square meters require substantial effort and 
investment rather than generate any significant income. According to the second 
October 1993 round of the ISEPN survey, the cost of inputs into such country plot 
production averaged 42.5 % of the total value of the output. The cost of travel (let 
alone time spent) to a 'dacha’ (the Russian word for a summer house), particularly 
significant in large metropolitan areas due to longer distances (up to 150-200 km), 
should also be taken into account.
Thus the actual significance of the income gained from a plot becomes at least twice 
smaller than even the modest proportion shown by the above ISEPN survey figure. It 
is also worth mentioning that this kind of food production cannot at all be regarded as 
efficient, nor is it a rational way of adjustment to economic hardships. It looks rather 
like an archaic means of self-subsistence through naturalisation of consumption, 
which is hardly consistent with the very essence of market-oriented transition. The 
above consideration would dispute the bias to overstate the importance of country 
plots for consumption of Russian households, which is common to publications of 
many Western experts. Moreover, a commonly available means of self-support 
would hardly compensate for the loss of income induced by the massive delay in 





























































































Private transfers through family networks or from friends and neighbours make up 
another source of aid available to many poor households. In Russia, as in many other 
countries, private safety nets act as the most important means of poverty relief. 
Although such transfers do not go exclusively to lower income families they benefit 
such vulnerable groups as new households, elderly pensioners, female-headed 
households with many children, the disabled and those affected by unemployment. 
According to the RLMS data, private transfers averaged 40 per cent of the recipient 
households income and brought poverty rates 10 percentage points down as 
compared to households which were not involved in private safety networks [World 
Bank, 1995, p. 51]. Intra-family transfers are much more important than assistance 
based on other than family ties. Although transfer behaviour tended to persist during 
the difficult reform years despite high inflation, the decline in incomes, and the rise in 
inequality, its pattern is now undergoing changes. In the pre-reform years transfers 
were typically received by younger families from their better-off parents. Nowadays 
it has became more common for elderly pensioners to get support form their children, 
including especially those engaged in new private businesses. In the latter case 
particularly, the recipients of such transfers are much less likely to represent a low 
income or vulnerable group.
In addition to the supplementary incomes, means of self-support and private transfers 
underscored in Goscomstat statistics, there are possible economies of scale in 
household consumption which are not captured in the MOL subsistence minimum 
used as a poverty line. Substantial economies in consumption may occur as the size 
of the household increases. For poorer households, however, significant economies 
of scale are less likely because their consumer pattern is largely dominated by 
foodstuffs, but this factor may become more meaningful with a further increase in 
housing and utility prices.
To make up for the above deficiencies the RLMS approach suggested using 
household expenditure as a better measure of living standard rather than reported 
nominal income. However, the RLMS expenditure-based headcount poverty index 
for individuals does not prove to be too different from the pattern emerging from 
Goscomstat estimates. Moreover, the RLMS expenditure data yields an incidence of 
poverty which is even higher than Goscomstat numbers: 26.2 % for July-September 
1992, 36.9 % for June-September 1993 and 30.9 % for October 1993 - February 
1994. Hence this evidence does not confirm the hypothesis that Goscomstat 
overstates the rate of poverty or that the real consumption of the poor is higher than 
shown by incomes statistics. For all this, the Goscomstat per capita income data may 





























































































The Goscomstat poverty rates can also be compared with those given by Milanovic, 
who sets the poverty line used for international comparisons at US $ 120 a month 
multiplied by the 1990 local currency purchasing power parity (PPP). This method is 
used to obtain the local currency poverty line equivalent for 1990. That number is 
then adjusted to the country’s cost of living to get poverty lines for the subsequent 
years. The poverty line acquired by such a method for Russia is slightly higher than 
the Russian MOL subsistence minimum. According to this PPP methodology, the 
poverty rate in 1993 was 21 %, or well below the Goscomstat number (31%) 
[Milanovic, 1995, p. 15-16]. A similar estimate for the pre-reform period of 1987-88 
reveals only 2 % of the population in poverty. Thus the PPP poverty rate estimates 
offer a much more optimistic picture differing from all other estimations based on 
different methodology. It is also worth mentioning that the same approach yielded 
surprisingly low poverty rates for several other countries in transition (data for 1992- 
93): 17 % in Romania, 16 % in Poland, 12 % in Ukraine (to compare with 41 % in 
Belarus where conditions in the same period were not too different), 2% in Hungary,
1 % in Slovakia, less than 1 % in the Czech Republic and 0 % in Slovenia (the latter 
known by a high level of unemployment). [Milanovic, 1995, p. 16]. Discrepancies of 
the above figures with the other available evidence may thus call into question the 
validity of the PPP methodology for poverty rates estimates.
As has been mentioned in Section 2, living standards differ widely in the 
geographically extensive and diverse Russian regions. This differentiation becomes 
more evident in the course of the transition due to the growing disparity in regional 
economic and social conditions. Differentials in major welfare indicators are reflected 
in broad variations of poverty rates across the 89 regions constituting the Russian 
Federation. There are no complete data which make possible estimates of poverty for 
each region. A number of recent surveys nevertheless allow us to outline general 
trends on a regional basis by analysing situations in selected regions. A sample 
survey by the Ministry of Social Protection (MOSP) undertaken in October 1994 - 
February 1995 covered nine different regions. Another survey was conducted in 
February - March 1994 by the Centre for the Study of Living Standards under the 
Ministry of Labour (MOL) in two regions: Republic of Adygeya and Republic of 
Yakutiya (Sakha). These two surveys provide the most recent and comprehensive 
source of information on the incidence of poverty by region.
The regions included in the two surveys represent four types of territories differing by 
economic specialisation and level of industrial development:
1) Three relatively affluent territories, rich in natural resources and specialising in 
mining and energy industry: the oil and gas producing Khanty-Mansiysky 
Autonomous District in North-Western Siberia; the city of Magnitogorsk in the Urals 




























































































Yakutiya (Sakha) occupying a vast territory in the far Northeast with abundant 
resources, including the largest gold and diamond reserves. The same type of 
economic specialisation also exists, though does not fully determine the economic 
structure of another region surveyed - Krasnoyarsky krai, the largest region of Russia 
in Central Siberia;
2) Two of the traditionally poor regions - the Chuvash Republic in the Volga river 
region, specialising in industries suffering from massive decline in output, i.e. light 
manufacturing, engineering and unproductive agriculture, and the small Republic of 
Adygeya in the Northern Caucasus, a region characterised as a whole by a low level 
of industrial development, poor economic and social infrastructure, substantial labour 
surplus and land shortage;
3) Territories dominated by machine-building industries and the military-industrial 
complex: Moscow oblast (excluding the city of Moscow) and Tver oblast in Central 
European Russia, with a similar industrial structure also largely characteristic of 
Krasnoyarsky krai and to a certain extent of the city of Voronezh;
4) Regions specialised in intensive agriculture and food industry: Astrakhan oblast on 
the lower Volga, Oryol and Voronezh oblasts in the fertile Black Soil area of the 
European part of Russia.
The national average poverty line calculated according to the MOL methodology was 
adjusted in the two surveys to the local price levels prevailing in the regions 
surveyed, thus allowing regionally specific poverty lines and the share of the 
population with incomes below that level to be obtained. In addition, the group of 
very poor was identified as those whose income was insufficient to cover the cost of 
the food component of the subsistence minimum consumer basket.
The survey revealed drastic variations in the incidence of poverty, ranging from 72 % 
for Astrakhan oblast to 17 % for Magnitogorsk city (Table 3). This difference can be 
partially explained by the monthly fluctuation in the poverty rate during the survey 
period, as this was not carried out simultaneously in all the regions. However, even 
when the data obtained relates to the same period (November 1994) a gap which is 
twice as big exists between the wealthy city of Magnitogorsk (as it is by Russian 
standards) and the poor Republic of Chuvashiya. This evidence corresponds to the 
overall regional breakdown of real wage and income levels. The poverty rates are 
highest in the mainly agricultural regions of Astrakhan, Oryol, Adygeya followed by 
regions dominated by light manufacturing, machine building and armaments 
industries like Chuvashiya, Moscow oblast and Tver oblast. Poverty is much less 




























































































The poverty rate in Voronezh oblast was lower than in other regions with a similar 
economic structure: mainly agricultural specialisation for most of the area with heavy 
concentration of machine building in the oblast centre. This may be partially 
explained by the fact that the survey was carried out there in October 1994 when the 
situation was significantly better than in the following months when the MOSP 
conducted the survey in the other regions. In addition, it may also be an effect of the 
social policy pursued by the local government which continued to subsidise prices for 
basic foodstuffs on a larger scale than in other regions while many regions no longer 
provide such price subsidies.
Apart from the very high general incidence of poverty, particularly in the 
economically depressed regions, a stunning result of the two surveys is the extremely 
high proportion of the very poor who are likely to experience real famine and thus 
face a problem of physical survival. According to the MOL Adygeya and Yakutiya 
survey, the real food consumption of the very poor (on average for the group) 
amounted in Yakutiya to only 36 %, in Adygeya to 58 % of the norm suggested by 
the subsistence minimum food basket [Volkova and Migranova, 1994, p. 32],
Sharp contrasts in living standards and poverty rates exist not only between large 
regions but are essentially associated with types of residence: large cities, small 
towns or rural areas. The incidence of poverty in smaller towns was higher than in 
the regional centres in five out of the nine regions in the MOSP survey. Higher 
incomes increasingly concentrate in the largest cities which become major centres for 
the development of new private businesses, the commercial and banking sectors, 
while the transformation of the economic structures in smaller settlements is impeded 
by the underdevelopment of a necessary infrastructure. Smaller towns suffer more 
from the decline of local industrial enterprises which are unable to adjust to new 
economic conditions as there are much less opportunities in the regional labour 
markets compared to large metropolitan areas, while labour mobility is hindered by 
many economic and social factors, not least by the lack of available housing and the 
housing market. The ISEPN 1993 survey of four Russian cities revealed that in a 
small town of Vyazniki a second job was available to 5 % of local labour force, 
while in the metropolis of St. Petersburg and the medium-sized regional centres of 
Petrozavodsk and Astrakhan secondary employment extended to 20 % of workers 
[Mozhina et al., 1995, p. 43].
In three of the MOSP surveyed regions rural poverty was markedly higher than in 
urban areas. Rural residents in general found themselves considerably disadvantaged 
in the new economic situation. The cuts in subsidies to the agricultural sector 
combined with the strongly negative effect of price liberalisation on inefficient 
fanning led most farmers to particularly difficult financial straits. Price increases for 




























































































agricultural products and undermined their competitiveness. The terms of trade 
changed dramatically in favour of urban residents. Agricultural producers faced 
demand constraints and intense competition from imports on the product markets. 
The incomes of farmers and farm employees fell more sharply in comparison with 
industrial workers. Economic hardships do not allow outdated machinery and farm 
equipment to be replaced. For all these reasons many regions experienced a profound 
decline in farm production. Some regions have considerable hidden unemployment in 
agriculture, resulting in a loss of wage income for the affected farm workers. Rural 
areas are also disadvantaged in possibilities for alternative employment and hence 
sources for additional incomes. Thus opportunities for the rural population to improve 
their well-being are extremely limited. In addition, there is a widespread collapse of 
infrastructure and social services in rural areas, which has always been far inferior to 
those of the cities. Rural poverty, however, is less acute in fertile regions which are 
used for intensive farming, allowing household food production to provide adequate 
food products for rural families. This is a case evident from the survey data on Oryol 
oblast (located in the fertile Black Soil area) where the incidence of rural poverty was 
nearly twice as low than in the oblast centre city of Oryol. Such self-subsistence 
virtually does not produce any cash income, so the livelihood of households in such 
regions may consist entirely of consumption of the harvest collected from private 
plots.
The headcount incidence of poverty, although extremely high in a number of regions, 
does not give a full picture of the severity of the problem as it does not say anything 
about the depth of poverty. Russian statistics also offer estimates of the poverty gap 
ratio with the intention of showing how deep poverty runs. The poverty gap is 
defined as a an aggregate deficit of the income of the poor, needed to bring them up 
to the poverty line. It is expressed as a percentage of total income. There are also 
estimates of poverty shortfall as a percentage of GDP (Table 4). The country-wide 
poverty gap more than doubled in 1992 and nearly doubled again in 1993. The 
intensity of poverty fell markedly in 1994 but this improvement was not maintained 
as in 1995 the poverty gap grew again. The end of 1995 and the beginning of 1996 
demonstrated new signs of improvement, showing an overall decline in the gap.
It is reasonable to expect that regional variations in the poverty gap ratio are no less 
significant than they are for the headcount poverty index. The MOSP survey data 
(Table 3) provides quantitative per capita monetary estimates of the poverty shortfall 
calculated for an average poor individual at February 1995 prices. The picture does 
not fully match the regional breakdown for the headcount poverty index. For 
example, the intensity of poverty proved highest in the Khanty-Mansiysky District, 
which has the lowest headcount poverty ratio while in the poor Chuvash Republic the 
poverty gap does not look so dramatic. Taking into account both indexes, Voronezh 




























































































regions in the sample. In each region, however, an aggregate poverty gap counts tens 
to hundreds of billion rubles - amounts which question the feasibility of poverty relief 
programs on such a scale. In most regions such sums of money are clearly 
unavailable for social assistance needs.
The above estimates of the poverty gap may question the view suggested by 
Milanovic that poverty in Russia is ‘shallow’. Milanovic asserts that despite the high 
numbers, the poor in Russia, as in other East European countries, do not represent a 
clear "underclass" as, for instance in Latin America [Milanovic, 1995, p. 27-28]. The 
income of an average poor person in the transition economies is some 20 per cent 
below the poverty line, while in Latin America it is 40 per cent below the poverty 
line. Milanovic rightly points out that the poor still possess substantially high 
educational levels, reasonable dwellings and household assets and enjoy access to 
major social services, including schooling for children and health care, all of which 
does not differ them too much from the rest of the population. The decline in their 
income is still recent and looks as though it is a transitory shock.
There are doubts, however, that economic growth may easily provide "trickle down" 
effects to pull large numbers of the poor up above the poverty line. Growth may not 
necessarily yield a desirable effect, allowing adequate levels of welfare to be 
restored. In Poland - which has had growth for three years - the poverty rate has 
remained the same and levels of inequality have increased. Poland’s experience may 
be particularly instructive for Russia. Milanovic has made an attempt to distinguish 
factors that have contributed to the increase in poverty, specifying an overall decline 
in output and income, a rise m inequality and demographic change [Milanovic, 1995, 
p. 20]. It appears that for Russia the major cause of the increase in poverty has been 
the rise in inequality, which has proved to be more than twice as significant as the fall 
in income.
Although a certain amount of inequality was not unknown in Russia under the Soviet 
regime, the economic transition has seen incomes differentiation accelerate at a speed 
which is unprecedented, not only in Russia but in most developed market economies. 
The structure of incomes distribution stabilised only in 1995 when it had already 
acquired a very unequal configuration. Evidence available on the extent of inequality 
differs but all the sources show a steep rise throughout 1992-1994. Gini coefficients 
calculated from Goscomstat data are 0.35 for 1992, 0.40 for 1993, 0.41 for 1994 and 
0.39 for 1995 showing a dramatic increase up from 0.26 for 1990.'° Although 
measurements based on the Goscomstat data may have well-known drawbacks, 
including an incomplete account of certain forms of incomes, e.g. from various 
informal economic activities, they underestimate rather than overstate the extent of 





























































































Thus, although the measures of inequality for the pre-reform period may well have 
been understated, it quite likely applies to the current situation even more as sources 
for unreported high earnings have multiplied. This assumption is confirmed by 
alternative calculations, for example by the RLMS and VCIOM survey results which 
show higher rates of income inequality than those given by Goscomstat. RLMS data 
yielded the Gini coefficient of 0.49 as of the end of 1993 while in the VCIOM 
sample it was 0.46 for March 1994 [World Bank, 1995, p. 30], These measures of 
income inequality fall within the range of countries characterised by a strongly 
unequal income distribution, such as Argentina or the Philippines, and are much 
higher than levels in Western Europe. This analysis suggests that economic growth 
alone in Russia will not be sufficient to achieve a reverse trend in the incidence and 
intensity of poverty.
If it takes too long for output to recover or growth is not accompanied by a decrease 
in inequality, the welfare of the poor is unlikely to improve. When poverty persists 
over a longer time span the poor may lose their human capital and gradually acquire 
characteristics which differ from the rest of the population and which will make their 
path out of poverty still more difficult. The likelihood of such a prospect presents a 
particularly serious challenge to social policy-makers. Appropriate income 
distribution policies and social safety nets are vitally necessary. The success of their 
design and implementation largely depends on how they address the major 
determinants of poverty and take into account the social and demographic 
composition of the population affected by it; this is the subject to which we will turn 
in the next section.
4. The Composition and Determinants of Poverty
The expansion of massive poverty in Russia has been largely induced by new factors 
which were unknown in the times of Soviet rule. Poverty - which in the pre-reform 
period was limited to certain vulnerable categories of the population - has extended to 
social groups which used to be securely protected against the principal social risks. 
At the same time poverty among the traditionally poor groups has also intensified.
During the Soviet period for a household with two working family members there 
was virtually no risk of poverty. However, the income of only one working adult was 
often inadequate to support a family due to low wage levels and the official income 
levelling policy. This situation put at particular risk single-parent families or large 
families with more than three children or with other dependants (for instance, a 
disabled family member) as well as mainly young families where one of the parents 
was temporarily not working (often on maternity leave). Social benefits designed for 




























































































allowances, disability pensions and certain forms of assistance provided to single­
parent and large families, were barely sufficient to raise living standards up to the 
level of subsistence. Of these categories young families with small children normally 
found themselves only in temporary difficulty and they frequently received support 
from their parents. These difficulties were usually overcome with the resumption of 
regular employment, which was facilitated by the widespread provision of pre-school 
child care.
Pensioners on a low pension living alone were another high risk category as such 
pensions were unable to provide for a minimal level of subsistence. This risk was 
also high for people on disability pensions as in most cases those were relatively low. 
This group, however, represented a smaller number among pensioners since the 
majority had either a larger pension, or lived together with their children, being 
supported by them, or remaining employed and receiving both a pension and a salary.
Some families were also comprised of wage earners in poorly-paid occupations, 
including employees in the retail trade, primary education, some branches of light 
industry as well as lower-skilled medical staff and cultural (for instance, library and 
social club) workers. These branches of the economy were mainly occupied by 
women, so the low pay level did not necessarily cause poverty in dual-parent families 
with a male-household head earning a sufficient income. However, there was a higher 
risk of poverty for female-headed single-parent households. Finally, there has always 
been a small group of homeless and recently institutionalised population with the 
highest risk of poverty due to significant disadvantages for them in finding jobs which 
would provide them with housing.
The above groups of the so-called ‘old poor’ have found themselves in an even more 
disadvantaged situation under the new circumstances. They constitute a substantial 
part of those affected by poverty, as can be seen from evidence on the demographic 
and social composition of the poor, for both individuals and households (Table 5). In 
October 1993 the total amount of the poor were formed by children (28.2 % per 
cent), working age adults - 52.1 % (17.3 % of whom women aged 30 to 55, 17.5 %, 
young adults aged 16 to 30 - and 17.4 %, men aged 30 to 60) and 19.7 %, individuals 
of pensionable age. According to the 1995 MOPS regional survey data, 60 to 90 per 
cent of the poor by household were represented by families with children, while the 
share families comprised of pensioners varied by region between 7 to 32 per cent, the 
remaining 5-10 % belonging mainly to working age singles or childless families. 
These data show that although the share of pensioners representing a group of the old 





























































































Understanding that apart from family breakdown child poverty is mainly related to 
the low income of their working-age parents implies that massive poverty is caused 
by economic problems encountered by the economically active population. This is 
confirmed by evidence on the composition of the poor by the labour force status of 
the household head. In the 1993 RLMS data, 67 % of the poor were employed and 
only 5 % unemployed, 21 % per cent were represented by pensioners, 5 % by 
disabled persons, 1 % by students and 1 % by mothers on maternity leave [World 
Bank, 1995, p. 19]. The prevailing number of the working poor and the appearance 
of the unemployed in poverty are clearly new phenomena associated with the 
difficulties of the transition. These groups of the ‘new poor’ outnumber the old. The 
change in the social composition of the poor indicates new determinants of poverty 
working in combination with traditional factors. Their significance can be revealed by 
the evaluation of the poverty risk in different demographic, social and occupational 
groups.
As wage earnings failed to keep up with inflation, the fall in real incomes appeared to 
be the most important new determinant of poverty. A normal family with one or two 
children and with both spouses employed which was very unlikely to be poor in the 
pre-reform period, formed the most numerous category of the new poor, occupying a 
40 per cent share of the total population below the poverty line [Mozhina et al. 1994, 
p. 23]. In addition to traditionally low-paid occupations, a substantial number of 
earlier higher paid employees fell into poverty. A most striking new development 
has been the very low wage levels in the state budgetary sector, notably in 
education, research, social, cultural and health care services. In 1995 earnings in 
these sectors amounted to no more than 60 per cent of those in industry.11 Wages 
in the troubled agricultural sector and engineering and textile industries are only 
half of the average in industry and are as low as those in the budgetary sector. 
Unable to cope with massive inefficiencies and suffering from the drastic fall in 
demand, the latter three sectors have experienced a profound decline in output. 
Another striking development of the transition is that professionals and engineers 
(who were traditionally underpaid in Russia) have suffered even more. Their 
wages have fallen to levels on average 1.2-1.3 times lower than those of low- 
skilled workers, due particularly to the very low earnings of teachers and medical 
staff. The majority of professionals are employed in the budgetary sector, which 
has the lowest pay levels. However, even in the private sector professionals do 
not earn much more than blue collar workers, reflecting the tradition of 
underpayment for high skills. This can be seen from data on the composition of the 
working poor grouped by professional status obtained form VCIOM surveys (Table 
6). Skilled workers and professionals there accounted for the largest shares of 
respectively 50 % and 16 %. A high incidence of poverty among previously higher 
paid professionals can be explained by the predominating share of currently low paid 




























































































state budgetary sector employees were paid wages below the level of subsistence 
minimum.
This situation reflects the grave problems of such sectors of the economy as 
education, research, health care and cultural services as well as the military industrial 
complex. Poverty has widely affected the most qualified part of the working class 
and the so-called former middle-class, which in the Russian context comprises high 
professionals and intellectuals. It has extended to employees of such sectors as 
science and higher education, which have never had similar problems in any 
developed market economy or even in a developing country. As a result, Russia is 
witnessing a rapid erosion of its highly developed research base and university 
education that has been built over the years. As for skilled workers affected by 
poverty, this is largely a result of the steep industrial decline and respective fall in real 
wages, particularly in such industries as machine building or light manufacturing. 
August 1995 wage levels averaged only 95 % of the subsistence minimum in the 
health care sector, 81 % in agriculture, 77 % in education, 76 % in the light 
manufacturing industry and 74 % in culture and arts.12 This explains the high 
concentration of the working poor in the above sectors of the economy.
Apart from the erosion of nominal wages, the situation in large areas of the economic 
activity is aggravated by widespread wage arrears, contributing greatly to the 
expansion of poverty among employees of several industrial branches, and the 
population of whole regions where this problem is particularly acute. Massive delays 
in wage payments can be regarded as a specific new poverty factor.
The large number of poor children indicates that the weight of dependants continues 
to be an important determinant of poverty. The risk of an average family’s becoming 
poor significantly increases with the number of dependants in a household. This 
traditional factor causing poverty in large and single-parent families grew in 
significance due to the sharp rise in the cost of living and the erosion of social 
transfers available to such families, primarily child allowances. The incidence of 
poverty among the RLMS households for the period of October 1993 - February 
1994 was 28 % for those with one child, 36 % for those with two children, and 52 % 
of those with three or more children [World Bank, 1995, p. 17]. Although the 
average family size in Russia is 3.2 - which is not large - families with three and more 
children form a significant minority of 8 % (about 2 million families) with a high 
probability of becoming poor [Mozhina, 1995, p. 89].
Child allowances, in existence in Russia since 1990, have been unable to prevent 
child poverty due to the fact that they are so low: they have been allowed to 
devaluate by inflation to a greater extent than the other social transfers. The amount 




























































































value has shrunk together with the minimum wage due to poor indexation. At the end 
of 1994 the level of child allowance was equal to only 18 % of the minimum 
subsistence for a child,13 so it contributed no more than 8% to the budget of an 
average poor household [Mozhina et al., 1995, p. 95]. Such a low level of child 
benefit may be regarded as an additional cause of poverty in large and single-parent 
families. Moreover, evidence available suggests that despite formally universal 
coverage, households having no members with regular jobs tend to be excluded from 
family support schemes. This situation is created by the bureaucratic problems of 
their distribution. They are normally paid through the place of employment, so access 
is more difficult for parents who have become unemployed, as well as, for the self- 
employed and those engaged in the informal sector. The provision of these benefits at 
the place of residence, although theoretically a possibility, has often faced difficult 
practical problems of bureaucratic and financial nature. In addition, as with other 
social transfers, there may be considerable delays in payment of child allowances. As 
a result about 20 % of families were either excluded from child benefits or did not 
receive them regularly [Mozhina et al., 1995, p. 95].
Single-parent households, which are more widespread than a large family, are more 
likely to be poor than a two-parent family. They form about one third of all families 
with children and about 36 per cent of them are poor [Mozhina et al., 1995, p. 88]. 
These are predominantly female-headed households where women bear the burden 
of being the bread winner for the family. This status extended to 44 per cent of 
female respondents in the VCIOM survey. Such families have particular difficulties 
in adjusting to their circumstances and for this reason require high priority social 
assistance.
Unemployment has become a new and important determinant of poverty. Loss of 
work is linked to a very high risk of becoming poor. In the RLMS data the presence 
of an unemployed family member exposes such a household to twice as high a 
poverty risk (43.2 %) than the average for all the households in the sample (24.3 %) 
[Braithwaite, 1995. p. 26]. Reductions in employment in Russia have been much 
lower than output falls. In 1995 registered unemployment was no more than 3 % of 
the work force. Estimates for total unemployment, including those unregistered, come 
to 8 %.14 However, job status has changed for a much larger proportion of workers. 
Nearly 10 % of these were obliged to take involuntary unpaid leave and over 6 % 
have been subjected to shorter working hours with a corresponding drop in earnings 
[OECD, 1995, p. 126]. This is a strategy to which many enterprises resort instead of 
inflicting mass dismissals. The registered unemployed on unemployment benefit 
(1,854 thousand of the 2,228 thousand total of registered people, or 83 % as of 
November 1995) are a one third minority of the total number of unemployed, most of 
which do not receive any relief in the form of social transfer.15 But even for people on 




























































































only one tenth of the average wage and to one third of the subsistence level minimum 
[OECD, 1995, p. 197],
Retirement pensions - which took the largest share of expenditure on social transfers 
in Russia - were in general better adjusted to inflation compared to other social 
benefits. This meant that any further expansion of poverty among pensioners was 
prevented. The average pension in late 1995 was equal to 107 % of the subsistence 
minimum for pensioners, although the minimum pension was only about half of it, 
poverty could thus not be avoided unless there was additional support.16 On the 
whole, pensioners are at no higher risk of poverty than the population of a working 
age. The incidence of poverty among them is slightly lower than for the population as 
a whole. There are, however, wide variations in the positions of different groups of 
pensioners.
Pensioners who are still employed (about 20 % per cent of their total number) run 
virtually no risk of poverty. This risk is also significantly lower for the elderly who 
live in larger households together with their children. The situation is more difficult 
for households comprised purely of pensioners; however, two pensioners living 
together are less likely to be poor even compared with households comprised of two 
incomes and one child. Pensioners living alone are at the highest risk, and this 
increases further with age. There is also a gender difference among the elderly. For 
elderly females the poverty rate is nearly twice as high as that of males (44 % against 
22.5 % by RLMS data) [World Bank, 1995, p. 21], the latter representing less than a 
third of ail the pensioners due to the considerably lower male life expectancy in 
Russia.
The ISEPN survey of the four cities revealed the proportion of high risk categories 
among pensioners. These include single pensioners (12 to 30 %, varying by city), the 
elderly over the age of 80 (6 to 12.6 %) and pensioner household-heads having 
dependants: children continuing education, grandchildren, single or divorced 
daughters on maternity leave or unemployed (8 to 16 %) [Mozhina, 1995, pp. 114- 
115]. The position of these categories, comprising in all from 26 to 58 % of 
pensioners depending on the region, is of particular concern with regard to adequate 
social assistance. Rural pensioners also have specific problems due to inadequate 
access to medical facilities and major social infrastructures. Their food consumption 
could be supplemented by a harvest from a private plot, but to farm a plot may be 
physically impossible for the elderly women living alone, now representing a major 
proportion of the residents of Russian villages. Weak health may also become a 
particularly serious problem for rural pensioners, precluding them from commonly 
available means of self-subsistence. In addition to caring for food procurement by 




























































































look after a cow, goats, hens, or whatever animals are in the household. All this is not 
easy for those of an older age, even when they are in good health.
In certain periods the poverty among pensioners was aggravated by the considerable 
delays in paying out pensions caused by the financial difficulties of the Pension Fund. 
More than any other category, pensioners depend on their small current income, so 
even a short delay in the payment of a pension causes serious hardship. The timely 
payment of pensions in Astrakhan, Petrozavodsk and Vyazniki in autumn 1993 
would have decreased the poverty rate among pensioners by 4-5 % [Mozhina et al., 
1995. p. 136]. The low level of pension provision causing poverty among the elderly 
is also related to the deficiencies in calculating entitled pensions. Universal federal 
standards are applied to pension entitlement regardless of the difference in the cost of 
living and social conditions of each region. Thus pensioners living in regions with a 
higher cost of living find themselves considerably disadvantaged and may have much 
higher poverty rates. This consideration highlights the need for adjustment within the 
pension system, to take into account inter-regional diversity. Although poor 
pensioners are in general fewer in number compared to the working age categories of 
the poor, there is much more limited means of adjustment and self-support available 
to them. For working age adults poverty is more likely to be a temporary 
phenomenon, while for pensioners in poverty this status is very likely to become 
permanent. In this perspective poor pensioners represent a long-term priority target of 
social policy.
Disability is another determinant of poverty not only for a handicapped person but 
also for the household where he (she) lives. Disability pensions range from the level 
of the minimum pension to two thirds of it (depending on the invalidity category), and 
so are in all cases well below the subsistence minimum. The presence of a disabled 
family member significantly raises the chance for such a family to be poor (from 25.2 
to 35.4 % according to the RLMS Oct. 1993 - Feb. 1994 data) [World Bank, 1995, 
P- 17].
Student scholarships have devaluated in real terms probably more dramatically than 
any other benefit, currently amounting to 10-12 % of the subsistence level minimum, 
hence creating difficulties for young people in higher education. It is indeed an 
important cause of poverty among the young. In addition, youth unemployment is 
aggravated by the considerable disadvantages in finding a job for new labour force 
entrants, particularly in economically depressed regions. Also the difficulties for 
young families with small children, often associated with poverty, increase due to a 
loss of wage income of one of the spouses while caring for a child.
Some specific categories of the poor such as the homeless and the deinstitutionalised 




























































































become more acute. 60.000 homeless children in Moscow have been reported 
[UNICEF, 1995, p. 76], This group of homeless has been augmented by the inflow of 
about four million (since 1992) migrants and refugees caused by the disintegration of 
the Soviet Union and the armed conflicts in Chechnya and the ‘near abroad’. This 
migration is likely to continue on a substantial scale in the coming years. The number 
of new migrants was over 800,000 in 1994, over 650,000 in 1995.17 Many of them 
need shelter and emergency social assistance. They have also joined the pool of those 
seeking jobs.
Another specifically poor group is composed of people with devious behaviour. In 
the Russian context, poverty in some cases may be related to poor life-style choices 
(in particular, alcoholism) which also contribute to the deterioration of such welfare 
indicators as health, and male life expectancy (declined from 65 years in 1987 to 59 
in 1995). The heavy drinking of a household head maybe a major reason for the 
poverty for his whole family, in which case it probably renders ineffective the 
provision of a cash benefit as a means of assistance.
The above analysis of the composition and determinants of poverty has far-reaching 
implications for the social policy-making. The large numbers of the ‘new poor’ - 
comprised mainly of wage-earners and the unemployed - have radically changed the 
nature of poverty and thus require a substantial modification of the system of social 
assistance. The distinction between the ‘old poor ‘ and the ‘new poor’ corresponds 
by and large to the difference between the poverty of the ‘weak’ and that of the 
‘strong’ [Gordon, 1995, pp. 132-141]. The traditionally socially vulnerable groups 
(the ‘weak’), comprising about 10 % of the population, which within the size of 
Russia yields a vast number of people, remain the primary target of social assistance. 
The safety net caring for ‘the weak’ obviously needs to become more effective, 
targeted and specific to particular categories of the poor. The way to improve the 
well-being of the working-age majority of the poor, among which a part of most 
active and qualified workers and intellectuals (the ‘strong’), lies rather in a general 
economic recovery, industrial restructuring, active labour market policies, the 
promotion of private initiative, particularly in small business development, as well as 
in a more vigorous income distribution policy.
5. Social Policy Assessment: Gaps in the Social Safety Net
The incidence and social composition of poverty clearly indicate the inadequacies of 
the social safety net. The system of poverty-relief in Russia is still underdeveloped 
and is negligible in scope and impact as compared to well-established forms of social 
benefits, i.e. pensions, sick pay, child allowances, unemployment benefits, maternity 




























































































housing and utility subsidies). Virtually none of the above benefits are targeted 
towards the poor. About three in ten very poor households (with an income of half or 
less than half of the subsistence level minimum) do not currently receive any public 
transfers [World Bank, 1995, p. 36].
The general concept which has prevailed in the Russian social policy institutions 
presumes that adults of a working age should provide for themselves by means of 
employment. Where appropriate they are entitled to unemployment benefit, sick pay 
and maternity benefit, which are universal with no restrictions. As regards family 
support, to alleviate the adverse effects of income inequality, particularly on children, 
child allowances are provided. However, as has been shown, the levels of most cash 
benefits are very low. For example, the level of child benefit is clearly insufficient 
even for low income households: 59 per cent of the poorest 20 per cent of families 
consider the level of child support to be insignificant [VCIOM, 1994, N 5, p. 45].
Child allowances have been designed with a broader objective than poverty relief, i.e. 
to provide income support to all families with children. From their introduction in 
1990 until December 1994 there were a number of different family benefits, including 
several small allowances for children’s clothing, food for newly-born babies etc. The 
core of the system, however, formed a universal child allowance which differed for 
children under 6 and between 6 and 16. Children under six years old were eligible for 
a benefit at the rate of 70 %  of the minimum wage. For children of single mothers or 
divorced mothers who were unable to get alimony this benefit was 1.5 times higher, 
i.e. 105 % of the minimum wage. Children aged 6 to 16 received a benefit of 60 %  of 
the minimum wage or 90 % if in a single parent family.18 This variation in the level of 
child benefit depending on age was criticised on the grounds that it costs more to 
support a child aged 6 to 16 than under 6. The justification, however, was that a 
family’s income tended to increase with a more mature age, while for younger 
families with small children the need for income support was more acute.
In December 1994 the Presidential Decree introduced a universal child benefit 
regardless of age instead of various child allowances. This change was later 
confirmed by the March 1995 Federal Law “On State Support for Families with 
Children”. Family allowances are still available to all families with children up to the 
age of 16 (up to 18 in the case of full-time students) irrespective of need. The concept 
is that each child, no matter in which family he (she) lives, has a right to government 
support, and it would be unfair to introduce any kind of discrimination. Such an 
approach could be reasonable in an economically stable society and in cases when 
such support is significant for a household. However, it is of little sense when the 
level of benefit is so small that it cannot prevent child poverty. The child allowance is 
a flat-rate, set up at the level of 60 % of the minimum wage and only 1.5 times higher 




























































































erosion of the minimum wage by inflation. In late 1995 the monthly amount of the 
child benefit ranged form 7 to 11 US $, which was worth of about two kilos of meat, 
or twenty kilos of potatoes.
Until December 1994 family allowances were funded from the federal budget, but 
since 1995 the financing responsibility has been devolved to regions, which has 
created new problems. Since three-quarters of the oblast budgets are in deficit, thus 
depending on federal transfers, there is regular underfunding, delayed indexation, and 
arrears in payment of those benefits.
To address the issue of child poverty these benefits should either substantially 
increase in volume - which does not seem realistic, or become targeted and income- 
tested. In the latter case, individual child support could increase in volume and 
become realistically significant for the needy. However, principles and the 
mechanism of targeting family support is still an unresolved issue, and a suggestion 
by the World Bank to restrict the child benefit to households with more than two 
children does not seem acceptable as this would exclude the majority of poor 
children in typically smaller families.
The family allowances discussed above should not be mixed up with maternity and 
child care benefits which existed in Russia long before the introduction of family 
allowances. All mothers are paid a maternity grant which is a single payment equal to 
five times the minimum wage. In addition, mothers who have been working receive a 
maternity allowance on the same terms as the sick pay. This is 100 % of the mother's 
wage, irrespective of length of service, payable through the whole period of maternity 
leave, that is, up to 126 days. After that time mothers are eligible for a child care 
allowance for a one and a half year period, equal to the minimum wage.19 This type 
of benefit has not been affected by the above changes in the system family 
allowances. The child-care benefit which serves to compensate for a former wage 
income of a mother caring for a child does not replace universal child allowance, to 
which she is also eligible. Maternity and child-care benefits are administered and 
paid out by enterprises to their employees on maternity leave, but financing is 
provided through the Social Insurance Fund, which is one of the four off-budgetary 
social funds deriving revenues through employers’ insurance contributions (the other 
three being the Pension Fund, the Employment Fund and the Fund for Compulsory 
Medical Insurance, each having federal and regional branches) [Mikhalev, 1996, pp. 
11- 12],
Levels of maternity benefit are generally substantially higher than those of family 
allowances, so may provide a reasonable amount of support (although this depends 
on the recipient’s previous wage, which may be low). However, the maternity 




























































































birth of a child. From then on and till the child reaches the age of 1.5 years the only 
income available to a mother (if she has been in work) consists of the child-care 
benefit (equal to the minimum wage) and the family allowance (60 % of the minimum 
wage, or 90 %  for a single mother), making the total amount of income equal to 1.6 
times the minimum wage (1.9 times in case of a single mother). This income can not 
replace the foregone wage income, as it makes up only about 11 % of the average 
wage (13 %  for a single mother, which is equal to US $ 17). This is clearly 
insufficient since it covers only one third of the per capita subsistence minimum in a 
situation when the needs of the family with the birth of a child increase substantially. 
The end of the child-care benefit after 1.5 years makes the position of the family still 
harder. Such a difficult situation provides at least one explanation of the dramatic 
decline in the birth rate in Russia from 16.7 births per one thousand of population in 
1985 to 9.5 in 1995.20
Gaps in the social security system have widened in Russia with new developments in 
the labour market. Essential benefits including child allowances, sick pay, child care 
and maternity benefits are generally attached to the formal sector of employment, and 
are paid out at the place of work. The self-employed or employees of small 
businesses, as well as the unemployed, have virtually no access to these benefits due 
to the poor arrangements for their payment at the place of residence. Child-care 
benefits are not available to mothers who have not been in employment prior to the 
birth and child-care period. This excludes from this kind of support the self- 
employed, students or housewives who have never worked (often the case with 
young families) and - which requires special attention - with young single mothers. 
So despite the fact that the myth of full coverage is still current, administrative 
records suggest that the ratio of the population covered by child and maternity 
benefits has shrunk and even that take-up rates may have fallen among eligible 
families [Faith, 1995, p. 32],
As already mentioned, support provided to the unemployed through unemployment 
benefits is also very low and covers only a small minority of people without job. 
These benefits are administered by local employment services and paid from the 
Employment Fund. New entrants to the job market receive a benefit equal to the 
minimum wage. Those who have been laid off, regardless of circumstances, receive 
75 % of their previous wage for the first three months without job, 60 % for the 
following four months and 45 % thereafter.21 The benefit is normally payable for up 
to 12 months. The unemployed of pre-retirement age (53 years for women and 58 for 
men) can receive the benefit for up to two years. The level of benefits is generally 
very low because they are tied to the last paid wage with no indexation, and thus 
rapidly devaluate by inflation. In addition, in many cases the last paid wage is very 
low due to short-time working hours, which typically apply to workers who are later 




























































































Surveys show that given this meagre level, the unemployment benefit is not attractive 
to people looking for jobs, and so does not stimulate them to register with the 
employment service. The large majority of the unemployed need active rather than 
passive forms of support, primarily help in job placement and retraining, or assistance 
in starting a small business. These forms of assistance are still very underdeveloped 
and are not very efficient.
The pension system also fails to provide adequate protection for about the one 
quarter of retired pensioners whose pension does not cover the required minimum of 
subsistence. The position regarding invalids on disability pensions is even more 
serious. Measures of income support prevail in social policy towards invalids, 
although for a quarter to a third of them (depending on the region) are group 3 
invalids who have a limited capacity to work. The disabled members of this group 
generally prefer to have a paid job, but only 37 %  of them in the large city of 
Krasnoyarsk actually work. Assistance provided to those of them seeking jobs by the 
local employment service is also very limited [Gimpelson et al., 1996].
The amount of income support available to the disabled depends on the degree to 
which the ability to work has been lost, but in any case is significantly lower than 
retirement pensions. Invalidity pensions to the group 2 disabled (who are unable to 
work but do not require permanent medical care) can be equal to 75 %  of the average 
wage, but cannot exceed the level of three times the minimum old-age pension. The 
pension level for group 3 invalids with a limited work capacity comes within two 
thirds of the full amount of the statutory minimum pension. Group 1 invalids require 
additional care and receive additional benefits for this, equal to two thirds of the 
minimum pension.
The fact that poverty status extends to two third of invalids in Russia highlights the 
inadequacy of the income support provided. Of particular concern is the most 
unprotected group of half a million lone invalids who cannot survive without 
extensive assistance and regular care [Golodenko, 1994, pp. 263-270], The hardships 
of invalids are not caused by their low income alone, while necessary services and 
care for them is generally even less adequate than income support.
All the forms of social protection discussed above are minimal state guarantees, the 
amount of which is legislatively determined at the federal level. Although the 
financial sources are divided between the off-budgetary social funds, the federal 
budget and regional budgets, the level of all major benefits is guaranteed by the 
Federal Government. In the case where sufficient funds are unavailable in a local 
budget (as may well be the case with family allowances) the region receives transfers 
from the special Fund for the Support of the Regions created within the Ministry of 




























































































considerably decentralised, which exacerbated regional disparities, including the 
available levels of social protection. The Federal Government currently has little 
responsibility with regard to poverty reduction above the minimal levels provided by 
major universal benefits, which - as we have seen - are in many cases insufficient to 
prevent poverty.
A federal system of means-tested benefits that would provide a poverty relief has 
never existed in Russia. At present, all programs of additional social assistance are 
left entirely to the responsibility of regional authorities, for which the Federal 
Government provides only the major guidelines. Given the information problems 
associated with the provision of social assistance, local authorities are best placed to 
identify who the poor are and how much assistance they need. Considerable effort is 
being devoted in many regions to provide social assistance. This will be considered 
in more detail in the last section, presenting the case study of the Krasnoyarsk city. 
Existing local programs of social assistance are extensive and have the potential to 
play an important role in alleviating poverty. However, the poor financial conditions 
of most regions render the majority of such programs ineffective, while increasing 
budget disparities contribute to inter-regional inequality in income levels and poverty 
rates. Thus the Federal Government commitment to poverty alleviation needs to be 
enhanced.
There are three core issues regarding the reform of social assistance in Russia: firstly, 
the need to provide adequate income support to the poor, secondly, the availability of 
funds, and, thirdly, the proper targeting of social assistance. One possible approach is 
to move to the model of West European social assistance systems. The key features 
of these models are: (i) an official poverty line; (ii) that having an income below the 
poverty line and assets below a certain minimum is a sufficient condition for 
eligibility; and (iii) that social assistance aims to cover the entire gap between the 
poverty line and the actual income. No East European country has any such system, 
although the Czech system apparently comes closest to it. [Milanovic, 1995, p. 42], 
The relevance of the traditional means of social assistance, i.e. means-tested safety 
net benefits, to the Russian situation, with the appearance of large numbers of the 
‘new’ working poor, is a matter of continuous academic and political debate. A 
common argument is that poverty-relief cash benefits cannot be offered to those who 
are working and whose poverty is caused by low wages rather than the existence of 
dependants or disability. Obviously a way out for the majority lies in more productive 
employment and adequate pay levels. Surveys of public opinion also show that an 
overwhelming majority (over 70 % )  in all income categories including the poorest 
prefer to solve their problems themselves rather than to request any support from the 
government. Thus a targeted means-tested form of assistance which does not yet 
exist in Russia would apply to those who cannot survive without government 




























































































less than half the subsistence minimum. According to VCIOM estimates these are 11 
per cent of pensioners and 14 per cent of the unemployed [VCIOM, 1994, N 4, p. 
29],
Nevertheless, the idea of introducing a federal means-tested poverty relief benefit 
which would be granted by application has not been abandoned and forms the core of 
the draft federal law “On Subsistence Minimum” worked out by the Russian Duma. 
It has not been adopted as yet but may be further advanced by the new Duma. One of 
the suggestions is to set up an income level equal to less than 50 % of the subsistence 
minimum as the eligibility requirement. However, its possible implementation entails 
a number of problems. Firstly, the practice and administrative framework for income 
testing is non-existent, so its introduction would be costly and organisationally 
difficult. Secondly, it is impossible to monitor full household incomes due to 
widespread informal activities and forms of support. Thirdly, social security budgets 
are unable to provide adequate funding to fully fill the poverty gap (although with the 
half of the subsistence minimum target the task would be easier). Fourthly, as the 
experience of other countries (e.g. Poland) shows, benefits are also likely to be 
claimed by income groups slightly above the adopted poverty line, so social 
assistance offices may be overwhelmed by the number of claimants, which will result 
in high "excess" error (both in terms of people and money spent).
The World Bank report on poverty assessment in Russia has also expressed concern 
about possible adverse work incentive effect, which may be created by the provision 
of the poverty benefit, particularly for those whose income is close to the minimum of 
subsistence [World Bank, 1995, p. 57]. If the poverty benefit provides the same level 
of income which can be earned through paid employment, people may be 
discouraged from looking for a job, or may lose the incentive to work harder, 
improve their skills, or seek a more productive job. However, the risk of adverse 
work incentives associated with poverty relief benefits in Russia does not appear 
significant. Firstly, as has been shown, the official minimum of subsistence is too low 
to make most people satisfied with such a living standard. Secondly, the amount of 
the poverty benefit is unlikely to be so generous as to attract a large number of 
claimants. It is even more probable to expect that the take-up of such benefits will be 
rather low. The majority of poor people are not yet used to their poverty status; an 
official acknowledgement of their poverty as a precondition to be entitled to the 
benefit implies a certain stigmatisation which may become a serious obstacle. Most 
poor people, particularly the ‘new’ working poor, would find it humiliating to apply 
for a poverty benefit especially if it is associated with means-testing; this has clearly 
been shown with the experience with unemployment benefits. Surveys show that the 
majority of unemployed males feel it shameful to acknowledge their inability to find a 
job and to ask for the dole [Mozhina, 1994, p. 67]. This is another reason why most 




























































































It is nevertheless clear that due to severe resource constraints the introduction of 
poverty benefit can only be effective when the number of claimants is relatively low. 
This would be possible when the key economic variables including the minimum 
wage, the minimum pension, minimum unemployment benefit, family allowances, 
maternity and child-care benefits are set up at adequate levels, so that most of their 
recipients cannot be candidates for social assistance.(The question of targeting family 
allowances is still valid in this respect.) The number of potential claimants for social 
assistance would then be less and inclusion or exclusion errors less frequent.
The above option, however, is not without its problems as it is not clear whether 
sufficient resources are available to raise the level of major social benefits up to 
adequate levels. Obviously, a significant redistribution of resources allocated to 
social purposes would be necessary. It would entail a certain change in the pension 
system and the other forms of social security provision (e.g. sick pay). The question 
to investigate is where possible savings can be made to redirect resources to targeted 
social assistance. One of the possible sources is the continued reduction of general 
subsidies for housing and utilities and through pension refonns, as suggested by the 
World Bank in its report on poverty assessment for Russia [World Bank, 1995, pp. 
63-64]. Such reform proposals are still far from ready solutions. Cuts in pension 
expenditures and housing subsidies affect large groups of the population who are for 
the most part not sufficiently well-off. Regarding possible cuts in pension expenditure 
there seem to be few options available. The pension regime in Russia cannot be 
considered as excessively generous as can be seen from the living standard of 
pensioners. The idea of a higher retirement age - which is often recommended by 
international experts - is very unpopular in Russia owing to low life expectancy. Over 
the past seven years life expectancy has been steadily declining: for men it is now 59 
which is below the pensionable age. With regard to life expectancy Russia is now 5- 
10 years behind developed industrial countries, and the public opinion is firmly 
opposed to any increase in pensionable age because many do not even reach their 
retirement. The problem is exacerbated by unfavourable health situation of the elderly 
population. An increase in the retirement age would also complicate the employment 
situation. Therefore this option is not currently acceptable for several economic, 
social and demographic reasons.
The only possible cut in pension spending could be achieved through the withdrawal 
of the right to combine full pensions with full-time work. The provision allowing 
pensioners to receive a full pension while continuing in full-time work may really 
seem generous and there are some good reasons for changing it. A pensioner 
deciding to stay in service after being entitled to a pension receives considerably 
higher total income compared to the pre-pension period. This is naturally a strong 




























































































compared to an average able-bodied employee. This is hardly justifiable given the 
general resource constraints and comparing the higher overall remuneration for 
working pensioners with their real labour input.
Resource constraints and the limited possibilities of redistribution for welfare 
expenditure may not allow a federal poverty benefit to be introduced in all regions of 
the country at the same time. Thus it could useful to follow a geographical targeting 
approach. Support could first be directed through federal transfers to selected regions 
that are especially poor, either due to economic dislocations caused by the transition 
or to high chronic unemployment [World Bank, 1995, p. 60]. Possible selective 
criteria could be higher regional poverty rates as well as higher than country-wide 
average cost of living (as major social benefits are rated according to federal 
standards regardless of regional disparity in the cost of living). The same approach 
may be useful with regard to the gradual uprating of the minimum wage, the 
minimum pension, family allowances, unemployment and other benefits to the 
poverty line (subsistence minimum) level.
It is clear, however, that improvements in transfer payments, if successful, can only 
make possible a redistribution of resources in favour of the very poor and help to 
alleviate (or eliminate) extreme poverty. The achievement of such a goal would not 
mean an end to the hardships of the wider group of the population (up to 50 %  or 
more) who also consider themselves poor. Moreover, the redistribution of resources 
through e.g. housing subsidy cuts, could make their position even worse. Meanwhile, 
due to their number and political influence - which is much higher than that of the 
poorest groups - they largely determine the outcome of parliamentary and presidential 
elections and hence the country's further economic and political course. Obviously, a 
properly focused poverty alleviation strategy would be effective in a wider policy 
framework comprising the promotion of employment, active labour-market policies 
(for retraining, wage subsidies, and public work schemes), income policies (raising 
minimum and social-sector wages in relation to the average wage) and which would 
work for the well-being of the majority.
6. Regional Programs of Social Assistance: A Case Study of the Krasnoyarsk 
City
Given the problems associated with the introduction of a universal poverty benefit in 
Russia, there is a case for retaining the currently existing system of social assistance 
while reinforcing indicator targeting (both low income and the other vulnerability 
criteria such as the number of children, single mother status, age of the household 
head, disability, unemployment and so on). This consideration is also relevant 




























































































groups are needed no less than cash forms of assistance. In order to provide social 
assistance for the most vulnerable groups, the Ministry of Social Protection has 
developed and, and since 1994 adopted, the Standard Regional Program for Social 
Protection with the principle objective of mitigating the impact of transition on the 
most vulnerable. The major target group of assistance are people living below the 
regional subsistence level minimum. The design and implementation of the program 
takes place at local levels and is regionally specific. It comprises various cash and in- 
kind benefits and services oriented to individual recipients. Their scope and volume 
depends on assessed needs and available resources. The major features of these 
programs include: (i) some form of income test to identify those in need or other 
obvious criteria like single pensioners or people with the minimum pension or less; 
(ii) in-kind transfers largely dominating over cash forms of support; (iii) funding 
mainly from local resources with some limited central government transfers.
Available information on local programs of social assistance is still very scarce, and 
statistics or published surveys are virtually non-existent. For this reason further 
analysis in this section is mainly based on data collected by the author during a field 
research visit to the city of Krasnoyarsk in May 1995. This city in Central Siberia has 
a 915,500 strong population and is an administrative centre of Krasnoyarsky krai. 
The information for this research has been mainly obtained by interviews with the 
officials of the Departments of Social Protection within the krai and city 
administrations. In addition, the heads of the departments provided valuable 
documentation, including annual departmental reports and local social monitoring 
data.
A considerable part of the activities of the regional departments of social protection 
consists in the administration and delivery of mandatory universal benefits and social 
services, including keeping records of pensioners and calculation of pension 
entitlements; paying out all kinds of pensions; monitoring people with disabilities, 
defining invalidity categories, entitlement and payment of disability pensions; 
payment of family allowances. These expenses are financed from the Pension Fund, 
the local budget and federal transfers.
Another important area of activities is the additional local level social assistance, 
provided in cash and in-kind, arrangements for discounts and subsidies to citizens 
eligible for housing, utilities, telephone and transportation expenses, and the 
provision of various social services to vulnerable groups among the local residents. 
Funds for this type of activities are mainly provided from local sources accumulated 
in the City Fund for Social Protection and district funds for social protection. They 
mostly originate from contributions by the regional and local budgets, the Pension 
Fund and the Social Insurance Fund and a portion of revenues obtained through the 




























































































The organisational framework for the delivery of social assistance and services in 
Krasnoyarsk has been developing so as to move it closer to the localities, i.e. city 
districts and individual neighbourhoods. In the decree of the city mayor of 25 June 
1992 six territorial centres “Socialnoye zdorovie” (Social Well-being) in different 
city districts were established with a total staff of about 200 social workers (which is 
not a very large number for a city with a population of nearly one million), including 
qualified sociologists, pedagogues, psychologists, lawyers and a number of medical 
specialists. An investment of about 300,000 US $ (over the three years from 1992- 
94) has been made to equip these centres (not a very impressive sum for the size of 
the city). However, as was acknowledged in a report by the krai Department of 
Social Protection, the capacity of the existing infrastructure for social assistance is 
still very inadequate compared to the need. It does not cover yet the whole territory 
of the region; the funding, equipment, and the number and skills of the personnel are 
insufficient to meet the acute demand. The judicial and methodological base for the 
operation of district centres for social assistance is also underdeveloped.
The successful performance of local centres providing social assistance largely 
depends on available information allowing needs to be monitored. The complete 
records of retired pensioners, invalids and other categories on welfare have been kept 
accurately by local departments of social protection for many years [Gimpelson et al., 
1996]. Such data has recently been extended to include large and single parent 
families. Apart from aggregate figures, it is detailed by groups and territorial units. 
This information, however, does not offer complete data on incomes, assets, housing 
conditions and is generally inadequate to evaluate the extent of poverty and particular 
needs of various social groups. The services of social assistance in Krasnoyarsk 
resort to the help of the local statistical office, while the city’s academic institutions 
doing sociological research and also try to conduct their own surveys. Their estimates 
suggest that 80 % of families in the Krasnoyarsk city need some form of assistance or 
services from the Department of Social Protection. The district centres have been 
equipped with computer facilities allowing a local database to be developed 
containing the so-called ‘passports’ of families in need. These passports, however, 
are compiled only on individuals and families that have already been clients of these 
services. Despite all these efforts, reliable information on household incomes is still 
lacking, creating major difficulties in the evaluation of the need.
In addition to monitoring these needs, the dissemination of information to potential 
recipients on assistance and services available is no less important. Among others, 
the purpose of such information is to address the problem of stigma associated with 
becoming a client of the welfare services, i.e. to help people overcome psychological 




























































































press, by the distribution of booklets and leaflets as well as posters in the streets and 
local transport.
Targeting is a key issue in the delivery of social assistance as well as in determining 
in which form the assistance should be provided. As becomes clear from the analysis 
of the composition of poverty in Section 5, working out the obvious categorical 
criteria of the need in Russia presents specific problems. A monitoring of incomes 
that would extend to an actual individual or household is inadequate, while certain 
readily attributes, such as demographic indicators and family composition, do not 
show significant correlation with poverty status. For example, single parent 
households are less than 8 % among the poor and only 9 % of the poor have three or 
more children [World Bank, 1995, p. 59]. With regard to housing conditions and 
asset ownership there is little distinction made between the poor and the non-poor, as 
the increasing poverty has not yet affected the long-standing asset holding of the 
population. Dwellings and most consumer durables were acquired by households, 
including those currently poor, during the years under the Soviet times when the 
incomes disparity was much less significant.
Coping with these difficulties local centres for social assistance try to rely on three 
major principles: (i) self-targeting, meaning that assistance is granted by application; 
(ii) declaration, and in some cases verification, of income details; (iii) use of other 
criteria in addition to low income, i.e. a limited earning capacity: three or more 
children in the family, single parent households, the presence of disabled or elderly 
family members, the alcoholism of a family member, etc. The arrangement of social 
assistance implies a considerable amount of administrative work, including individual 
interviews and home visits both to check the details of the needs as well as to deliver 
assistance. The approach is highly personalised with a risk of subjectivity and 
arbitrariness. Assistance is awarded on an occasional rather than on an on-going 
basis, which multiplies administrative routine work.
Administrative work is large and complicated also due to the multiple forms in which 
the assistance is provided. Cash support is only one, and not the most important, form 
of relief offered by local offices of social protection. For example, in 1992 this kind 
of additional cash support formed only 4 % in the total country-wide amount of 
transfers available to poor families with children, and was decreased to 1 % in 1993. 
[Mozhina, 1995, p. 95]. Meanwhile, cash forms of support are preferable to most 
categories of the poor: 50-60 % of them in the MOSP 1995 survey would choose 
assistance in cash, allowing a free choice how to use the support received. Such 
preference is also explained by the high inflation which rapidly erodes these small 
cash sums of money, especially when their payment is delayed. The total amount of 
cash relief provided by the Krasnoyarsk City Department of Social Protection in 




























































































attended to only 27 %  of the estimated needy families with three or more children 
and to only 6.5 %  of single mothers in need. The amount of support for an individual 
made thus a symbolic sum of 12,300 rubles (US $ 6) which was roughly equal to 14 
%  of the monthly average and 1 %  of the annual subsistence minimum. It was only 
slightly higher for single pensioners but five times as much for a small number of 59 
orphan children and 22 orphans among university and college students.
Local departments of social protection accord a higher priority to in-kind support, 
subsidies and services, considering these forms of assistance to be better targeted. 
Aid provided in kind is also preferable, for instance, in the case of drinking of a 
household head (which is not so rare) when it would better meet the real needs of the 
family. Compensation for housing, utility and transportation costs is larger in scope 
and coverage compared to direct cash assistance. Such subsidies had to be made 
higher due to the significant rise in housing rent, utility prices and transportation 
fares, which became too high for low income groups of the population. Local 
transportation subsidies are offered to all pensioners and school-children. Housing, 
utility and telephone discounts at the rate of 50 %  are automatically provided to all 
war veterans, disabled, and single pensioners, while for all the households with per 
capita income below the subsistence minimum they can be granted by application.
With regard to housing subsidies it is worth mentioning that the system of social 
protection cannot offer any improvement in housing conditions, which remain one of 
the most acute social problems in Russia, where 14 % of families live in 
overcrowded conditions (with 7 or less square meters of space per capita), 5 % of 
households have to share accommodation in ‘communalky’ (common flats) with 
other families with whom they have no family ties, and where half the dwellings lack 
some basic amenities such as water, sewers, telephone or central heating. The 
waiting list for public housing numbered ten million families in 1991. The economic 
crisis, tight budget constraints and the process of privatisation have virtually 
eliminated the possibility of getting a publicly provided housing, either from a local 
government or from an enterprise. Housing prices in the emerging private market go 
beyond the limits of the average citizen. The market cost of a two-room apartment of 
50 square meters in Krasnoyarsk comes to about 30,000 US $. This deters new 
entrants to the housing market, such as young families and migrants (forming from 10 
to 20 % of households, depending on the region), from becoming home owners. To 
rent an apartment privately, other than from the municipality or an enterprise, is also 
possible only for the wealthy groups of the population. In Krasnoyarsk a privately 
paid monthly rent may be as high as US $ 100, or close to an average salary 
(although much lower than in Moscow or St. Petersburg where it may reach $ 500 
and even more). Meanwhile, no subsidies are provided to those who have to rent 





























































































Access to home telephones, which are in acute shortage, also presents a critical 
social problem, apart from their high cost, and on average only 39 %  of households 
possess one. Meanwhile, for single elderly pensioners or invalids (not necessarily the 
poorest), who may need, for example, to call an ambulance, this may become a 
question of life or death. In 1994 the Krasnoyarsk City Department of Social 
Protection managed to provide 200 private telephones to single pensioners and 
invalids in the city. It should be mentioned to this regard that in a rural area of the 
same Krasnoyarsky krai there may be neither telephone available nor an ambulance 
to call.
A specific area of in-kind support and subsidies embraces assistance provided 
specially for children. This includes subsidies for kindergartens, school uniform, 
school meals and child recreation. Children of large and single-parent families have a 
priority access to such services. Of these forms of assistance school meals take the 
largest share, covering up to 40 %  of all school-children, while municipal discounts 
for kindergartens were available to less than 10 %, for school clothes - to less than 5 
%  of children, meaning that a large number of the poor children were excluded from 
this kind of support.
Special attention is paid by the authorities in Krasnoyarsk to the provision of summer 
recreation for children. This of kind service is in high demand among the population 
of Siberia and the Northern regions of Russia. It cannot be regarded as a luxury, 
given the harsh climatic conditions and the poor ecological situation of many of these 
regions, including Krasnoyarsk. Summer holidays at “pioneer” country camps were 
traditionally the most common form of recreation available to practically all 
schoolchildren. Most of these camps were arranged by enterprises. However, in 
the last two to three years it has become much more difficult for firms and 
governmental institutions to continue providing these services. Since the cost has 
become too high due to price liberalisation and inflation, and is no longer 
affordable for many enterprises. Firms do not have enough funds either to 
maintain these facilities, nor to subsidise the cost of holidays for children of their 
workers. As a result many of such facilities have been closed down, and the 
number of children receiving these services has steadily decreased. In 1994 only 
35 per cent out of 200 thousand schoolchildren in Krasnoyarsky krai had a 
chance to spend their holidays in country camps or resorts.
Thus the priority for governmental agencies is to provide recreation and health 
improvement for orphans, children with disabilities, for large, single-parent 
families, and for refugees. In 1995 the administration of Krasnoyarsky krai 
managed to allocate 12.3 billion rubles (2.7 million US $) from the regional 
budget to subsidise child recreation. 10 billion rubles were also contributed to the 




























































































million rabies - by the branch the Medical Insurance Fund. In addition, health 
improvement for children of the unemployed was financed by the krai 
Employment Fund (of the amount of 3 billion rabies) which also organised jobs 
for schoolchildren in the summer time.22 As a result, considerable funds were 
raised to improve the situation regarding child recreation. In 1995 80,000 
schoolchildren in the krai received organised recreation, which is 14 per cent 
more than a year ago.
Poor large families, single parents, the disabled and pensioners are target groups for 
such in-kind forms of assistance as sales vouchers for food or clothes, and pharmacy 
subsidies. (Access to health care in Russia has always been universal and free, but 
drags generally have to be purchased by the population. Inflationary price increases 
for drags have been among the highest). However, both the amount of spending per 
recipient and the coverage are very modest. In 1994 food sales vouchers were 
offered to 20,417 people (18.7 %  of the estimated population below the poverty line) 
with a cost of 8,930 rabies per person (hardly enough to buy a kilo of meat). Other 
consumer goods in kind were provided to 10,319 people (9.5 %  of the poor with an 
equally small amount of 11,415 rabies per person. Drag subsidies were given to an 
even smaller number of 2,748 people, although the amount of 14,073 per person was 
substantial at least as a one-time assistance. In addition, free hot meals were offered 
to 1,653 pensioners. This is also a small number which could be enlarged without 
considerable additional effort and expenditure, since, according to surveys, this type 
of care is highly appreciated by old and poor people.
The provision of various services to pensioners living alone, the handicapped and 
families with children has also received a high priority in the activities of district 
centres for social assistance in Krasnoyarsk. For single invalids and pensioners over 
the age of 80, home services and care are of greater importance than cash support. In 
1994 11,271 such people (notably higher than the number covered by free meals and 
drag subsidies) received this kind of service from district centres for social 
assistance, which means that this most unprotected category of the population is not 
left without help.
Another recently developing area of activity is that of consultant services (free of 
charge) by psychologists, pedagogues, lawyers and medical specialists on various 
issues of family life. The demand for such services, previously not very high, is 
increasing as the hardships of the new economic and social situation impose greater 
stresses on family. Such services have not been easily available and the private sector 
is not ready to offer them, quite apart from the likelihood of very high charges. 
Finally, the city department and district centres organised and financed cultural 





























































































The example of Krasnoyarsk shows that considerable positive experience in the 
provision of social assistance and poverty relief in various forms has been acquired in 
regions at the local level. An impressive infrastructure have been developed and 
personnel recruited and trained to address the most acute local social needs. In spite 
of this current social assistance efforts are inadequate in scope and number. The wide 
range of assistance and services described above require substantial administrative 
work and expenditure. With the limited funds available, administrative costs tend to 
dominate over spending on social support itself. The latter share does not exceed 20 
% of the total expenditures of the Krasnoyarsk City Department for social protection 
and its district centres. Limited funding can only allow occasional support to be 
provided, which cannot of course increase the recipients’ incomes to match the level 
of subsistence. The general opinion of government assistance among low-income 
households and the elderly is also low, and the number of recipients itself is 
significantly lower than the number in need. This is a typical situation in other regions 
as well. According to the Ministry of Social Protection survey in early 1995, only 10- 
15 % of households with incomes below the subsistence minimum received some 
kind of locally provided social assistance. This proportion has even decreased from 
15-30 % a year earlier. However, a suggestion by the World Bank to shift towards 
cash rather than in-kind assistance as a means of improvement does not seem fully 
justified. This could only be reasonable with regard to consumer goods and food 
sales vouchers. As for drug subsidies, they appear to be more effective and better 
targeted. Cash support also cannot replace essential services and care which may be 
of vital importance to specific categories of the population.
Better targeting also remains a serious problem. Assistance is offered to wide groups 
of the population: pensioners, large families, single mothers, while their individual 
income situations are judged by a social worker. Cash support from local programs 
of social assistance was also received by 5 to 20 % of higher income categories in the 
MOSP 1995 survey, and 5 to 15 % of that group had also access to housing 
subsidies. Due to these inclusion and exclusion errors such a system fails to support 
the poorest and swells the social expenditure. However, as the above analysis shows, 
local services of social assistance have considerable potential to play an important 
role in poverty evaluation. The problem at the moment, as everywhere, is that the 
impact of their activities is greatly diminished by the largely insufficient financial 





























































































The severe welfare crisis encountered by Russia, like by almost all countries in 
transition, has many dimensions, among which a high incidence of poverty persisting 
through the fifth year of the market reforms. Evidence from other countries suggests 
that a radical transformation of economic systems would not be possible without high 
welfare costs. The crisis of social welfare in Russia does not originate from the 
dislocations of transition alone, but has deeper roots in economic and welfare losses 
inherent in the deficiencies of the previous economic system. Underinvestment in 
industrial and social infrastructures, the depletion of essential resources by wasteful 
industrial production and high military expenditure, deep structural distortions created 
by pervasive price controls accompanied by massive shortages and suppressed 
inflation were among most significant causes of welfare deterioration. The ultimate 
collapse of the old system and the difficulties of the creation of a new one would only 
add impetus to the crisis.
The fall in incomes and expansion of poverty in the Russian case, however, have 
been exacerbated more than elsewhere by the spread of inequality. The formation of 
large private properties did not come about only as a result of the redistribution of 
natural resources and productive assets through the privatisation of state property, to 
which most ordinary people have never had real access. It also occurred as a result of 
an alienation of part of the population’s consumption fund by depressing their wage 
levels as well as by monopolisation of consumer prices. Hence, the capitalisation of 
the national wealth has also removed that part of it which used to be at the disposal of 
the working population. [Gordon, 1995, p. 115]. Such a development pattern in the 
Russian context is favoured by the weakness of the new democratic institutions, in 
general, and of labour unions, in particular.
A very unequal new pattern of development has been aggravated by the 
government’s move to carry out reforms by a primarily technocratic approach, where 
the major hardships deriving from the transition were placed on shoulders of the 
working population. In spite of frequent declarations on the importance of social 
policy, in the reality of reforming Russia it has been given a subordinate role to that 
of monetary stabilisation. Adjustment of the minimum wage and social benefits to the 
rate of inflation has been regularly delayed, so that social security and social 
provision bear the main burden of the tight monetary policies. The resulting pattern of 
development and reform policies largely explains the appearance of great numbers of 
a new working poor who have dramatically changed the composition and the overall 
incidence of poverty.
The above analysis has revealed different causes of poverty specific to particular 




























































































combination by region and type of settlement. The scope of social assistance 
provided to socially vulnerable groups in poverty is limited mainly to emergency type 
relief measures. The analysis shows that this whole system in Russia is far from 
satisfactory and needs considerable and immediate improvement. It is important not 
to allow poverty and deprivation to become a permanent condition of a substantial 
part of the population, thus forming a new underclass within the society. The danger 
is that the persistence of poverty may be accompanied by fundamental changes in 
cultural attitudes and behavioural patterns of the affected groups, which will make a 
way out of poverty for them still more difficult. Further neglect of social policies or 
the inability to implement them properly can only reinforce the emerging social 
exclusion. [Procacci, 1996]. Utmost care in this regard should be given to children in 
poverty - which means an immediate improvement in the system of child allowances, 
the provision of pre-school education and checks on secondary school attendance 
since this is undermined by the need to earn money for the family at an early age.
Social policy in a wider context cannot ignore the needs of a wider group of the new 
poor, comprising a large fraction of economically as well as politically active citizens, 
among which figure skilled workers, professionals, intellectuals. The political 
attitudes of these groups largely determine the outcome of elections and the political 
scene in general. Their support is thus crucial for the continuity of the reform. The 
utilisation of their skill and intellectual potential through adequate remuneration and 
employment in accordance with qualification is also essential for the success of the 
transition and the acceleration of economic development. In other words, they should 
not be left to survive by taking odd jobs or resorting to whatever means of self­
subsistence are available. An adequate living standard for the Russian middle class is 
equally important to maintain the levels of education, culture, research and 
technology development, which themselves provide key investments in the human 
capital and are therefore indispensable for the eradication of poverty. These 
considerations highlight the importance of coherence in social policies where 
assistance to the very poor (primarily children and the elderly) is unlikely to be 
efficient without active labour market policies, sound regulations for a more equitable 
income distribution (among which the uprating of the budgetary sector wages), and 





























































































T A B L E S .
T a b le  1.
T h e  Inc idence  o f  P o v e rty  .
Y ea r M o n th
P o v e r ty  L in e  
(ru b les /m o n th )
H e a d c o u n t R a tio  
(p e r  cen t)
N u m b e r
(m illion )
1989* 87.0 11.0 16.2
1991* 190.0 11.4 16.9
1992 Jan. 635 30.2 44.9
March 1,031 23.4 34.8
June 1,639 23.1 34.3
Sep. 2,163 18.9 28.2
Dec. 4,282 15.7 23.3
1993 March 8,069 34.7 51.5
June 16,527 24.7 36.6
Oct. 32,400 28.8 42.8
Dec. 42,800 22.8 33.8
1994 Jan. 54,100 31.0 46.0
March 60,388 11.0 16.3
June 85,700 14.0 20.7
Sep. 92,304 20.5 30.5
Dec. 145,397 18.5 27.5
1995 Jan. 179,458 33.3 49.4
March 218,934 39.6 58.7
June 277,358 28.0 41.5
Sep. 286,205 22.1 32.8
Dec. 327,300 15.5 28.9
* Poverty line applied prior to 1992 (minimum consumption budget) differs from the MOL subsistence 
minimum in use from 1992 onwards.
Sources: Braithwaite, Jeanine D. The Old and New Poor in Russia. Washington, DC: The World Bank, 1994 
(mimeo), tab. 1; Izvestia, 14 February 1996; Informatsionniy statisticheskiy bulleten N 13 (Informational 
Statistical Bulletin N 13). Moscow: Goscomstat, November 1995, p. 30; Obzor economiki Rossii, 111. 
1994 (Review of the Russian Economy, Third Quarter 1994). Moscow: Working Centre for Economic 




























































































T a b le  2 .
Q u a r t e r l y  P o v e r ty  R a te s .
Year Headcount ratio (per cent) Number (millions)
Q 1 Q 2 Q 3 Q 4 Q l Q 2 Q 3 Q 4
1992 26.8 23.9 18.9 15.7 39.9 35.5 28.1 23.3
1993 33.0 29.0 34.0 28.0 49.0 43.0 50.4 41.6
1994 25.3 25.1 23.1 21.4 37.5 37.2 34.4 31.8
1995 30.4 28.5 24.0 20.3 45.1 42.2 35.6 30.2
Sources: Izvestia, 14 February 1996; Informatsionniy statisticheskiy bulleten N  13 
(Informational Statistical Bulletin N 13). M oscow: Goscom stat, N ovem ber 1995, p. 30; Gbzor 
economiki Rossii, III, 1994 (Review of the Russian Economy, Third Q uarter 1994). M oscow: 






























































































The Incidence of Poverty and the Poverty Gap in Selected Regions.
R egion
A ll p o p u la tio n  in  
th e sa m p le
R es id en ts  o f  the 
o b la s t  centre
U rb an  resid en ts  
o th er  th a n  in the 
o b la st cen tre
R u ra l re sid e n ts  in 
th e sa m p le
P overty
gap*
S h are  
o f  the 
p oor
S h a r e  o f  
the very  
p oor**
S h a re  
o f  th e  
p oor
S h a re  o f  
th e very  
p oor**
S hare  
o f  th e  
poor
S h a re  o f  
th e very  
p oor**
S h a re  
o f  th e  
poor
S h a re  o f  
th e very  
poor**
A s t r a k h a n  
o b la s t ,  J a n .  
1 9 9 5
7 2 .4 4 4 .3 4 7 .5 5 7 .2 3 1 .7 7 7 .9 4 5 .6 6 9 .8
V o r o n e z h  
o b la s t ,  O c t.  
1 9 9 4
2 0 .4 1 0 .2 2 1 .5 1 2 .0 2 6 .0 1 4 .2 1 7 .8 7 .2 3 7 .2
K r a s n o y a rs k y  
k r a i ,  J a n .  1 9 9 5
4 3 .5 2 0 .1 3 8 .3 16 .3 3 7 .4 1 8 .7 5 2 .4 2 4 .2 6 1 .7
M a g n i to g o rs k  
c ity ,  N o v . 1 9 9 4
17 .0 4 .8 5 1 . 6
M o s c o w  
o b la s t* * * ,  J a n .  
199 5
4 1 .0 1 9 .7 4 2 .5 2 1 .1 3 5 .6 14 .4 5 6 .8
O ry o l  o b la s t ,  
J a n .  1 9 9 5
5 8 .7 3 2 .6 7 0 .9 3 8 .9 6 9 .6 4 2 .2 3 8 .6 2 0 .9 6 5 .8
T v e r  o b la s t ,  
N o v . 1 9 9 4
39 .1 1 8 .8 3 8 .4 1 7 .0 3 9 .2 1 9 .4 3 9 .4 1 9 .7 6 0 . 6
K h a n ty -  
M a n s iy s k y  
D is t r ic t ,  D e c . 
1 9 9 4
2 8 .8 1 3 .2 2 7 .0 1 2 .6 4 4 .7 18.1 1 1 6 .6
C h u v a s h  
R e p u b l ic ,  N o v . 
199 4
4 2 .5 2 2 .7 4 1 .0 2 2 .3 4 9 .0 3 1 .6 4 2 .7 1 9 .8 5 2 .1
R e p u b l ic  o f  
A d y g e y a , F e b . 
1 9 9 4
5 1 .9 19 .4
R e p u b l ic  o f  
Y a k u t iy a  
( S a k h a ) ,  
M a rc h  1 9 9 4
2 8 .4 5 .8
* As of February 1995, in thousands rubles average per capita. ** The group of very poor was identified 
as those whose income was insufficient to cover the cost of the food component of the subsistence minimum 
consumer basket. ***Excluding the city of Moscow.
Sources: The Ministry of Social Protection survey (materials have been kindly shared with the author by 




























































































T a b l e  4 .
T h e  P o v e r ty  G a p .
Year Poverty gap as per cent of 
income








Sources: Braithwaite, Jeanine D. The Old and New Poor in Russia. Washington, DC: The World 
Bank, 1994 (mimeo), tab. 1 ; Socialno-economicheskoye polozhenie Rossiiskoi Federatsii v 
yanvare-iyune 1995 goda (The Econom ic and Social Situation o f the Russian Federation in 





























































































The Composition of the Poor by Demographic Group, as of October 1993.
Persons living in families with per 












- 6 years 4.5 9.9 7.8 38.7
6-16 years 8.4 18.3 14.3 39.6
Adults
16-30 years 8.0 17.5 18.5 29.2
Women
30-55 years 7.9 17.3 19.1 27.9
55+ years 6.9 15.2 15.8 29.5
Men
30-60 years 7.6 17.3 19.1 27.9
60+ years 2.1 4.6 6.1 23.4
Total population 45.5 100.0 100.0 30.6
Source: McAuley, Alastair (1996), ‘Russia and the Baltics: Poverty and Poverty Research in the 
Changing W orld’, Oyen, E., S.M. Miller and S.A. Samad (eds.), Poverty: A Global Review. 





























































































T a b le  6.
The Working Poor by Professional Status, March 1994.





Skilled workers 43 50
Unskilled workers 10 11
* Percentage o f the number o f respondents by columns.
Source: Economicheskiye i socialniye peremeny: monitoring obshestvennogo mneniya. VCIOM 
(Economic and Social Change: Monitoring o f the Public Opinion, The Russian Centre for the Study 
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N O T E S
1 Since the 1950s the G oscom stat has regularly carried out a family budget survey covering 
households’ income and expenditure. The sample com prised 47,000-49,000 fam ilies in late 
1980 s and early 1990 s and was claim ed to be representative. There are how ever doubts about 
the representation o f  the low er part o f the incom e distribution in the survey.
2 Poverty rate estim ates for Russia are usually based on current m onetary incom es statistics. In 
the Russian case this is justified by the fact that personal savings were virtually elim inated by 
inflation. Household assets, as m entioned in Section 2, for several reasons have also very 
limited impact on current consum ption in low income households.
3 Izvestia, 14 February 1996.
4 The Russian Centre for Public Opinion Research (VCIOM ) conducts regular nationally 
representative surveys on a wide range of social and political issues. VCIOM  has also carried 
out a num ber o f special poverty surveys based on a sam ple o f over 3,000 respondents.
5 Izvestia, 26 January 1996.
6 Ibidem.
7 Izvestia, 23 D ecem ber 1994.
* The Russian Longitudinal M onitoring Survey was undertaken by the W orld Bank in 
collaboration with the Russian Goscom stat. It is a nationally representative survey of 
approxim ately 17,000 individuals in 6,500 households.
9 This discussion owes much to the input by L ilia Ovcharova.
10 Informatsionniy statisticheskiy bulleten N  13 (Informational Statistical Bulletin N 13). 
M oscow: Goscom stat, N ovem ber 1995, p. 18; Obzor economki Rossii, III, 1994 (Review of 
the Russian Econom y, Third Q uarter 1994). Moscow: W orking Centre for Econom ic Reform 
under the G overnm ent o f Russian Federation, 1994, p. 80.
11 Informatsionniy statisticheskiy bulleten N  13 (Informational Statistical Bulletin N 13). 
M oscow: G oscom stat, N ovem ber 1995, p. 24.
12 Calculated from Statisticheskoye obozrenie (Statistical Review), No. 11, 1995, p. 61.
15 Izvestia, 10 January 1996.
14 Statisticheskoye obozrenie, No. 11, 1995, p. 64.
15 Socialno-economcheskoye polozhenie Rossiiskoi Federatsii v yanvare-iyune 1995 goda 
(The Econom ic and Social Situation o f the Russian Federation in January-June 1995). 
M oscow: G oscom stat, 1995, p. 131.
16 Statisticheskoye obozrenie, No. 11, 1995, pp. 62,63; Russian Economic Trends. Monthly 
Update. 15 December 1995. M oscow: W orking Centre for Econom ic R eform  under the 
Governm ent o f  Russian Federation and Russian European Centre for Econom ic Policy, 1995, 
tab. 9.
17 Statisticheskoye obozrenie. No. 11, 1995, p. 8.
18 Chelovek l  trud (M an and Labour), 1994, No. 2, p. 61.
19 Chelovek I trud, 1994, No. 2, pp. 60-61.
20 Statisticheskoye obozrenie, No. 11 ,1995, p. 7; Poverty, Children, and Policy fo r  a Brighter 
Future. Florence: UNICEF, International Child Development Centre, 1995, p. 110.
21 Chelovek I trud, 1994, No. 2, p. 57.

























































































































































































EUI Working Papers are published and distributed by the 
European University Institute, Florence
Copies can be obtained free of charge 
-  depending on the availability of stocks -  from:
The Publications Officer 
European University Institute 
Badia Fiesolana
1-50016 San Domenico di Fiesole (FI) 
Italy



























































































Publications of the European University Institute
To The Publications Officer
European University Institute 
Badia Fiesolana
1-50016 San Domenico di Fiesole (FI) -  Italy 
Telefax No: +39/55/4685 636 
E-mail: publish@datacomm.iue.it
From N am e...................................................................
Address...............................................................
□  Please send me a complete list of EUI Working Papers
□  Please send me a complete list of EUI book publications
□  Please send me the EUI brochure Academic Year 1997/98
Please send me the following EUI Working Paper(s):
No, Author ............................................................................




T itle : ............................................................................
No, Author ............................................................................





























































































Working Papers of the Robert Schuman Centre
RSC No. 96/1 
Ute COLLIER
Implementing a Climate Change Strategy in 




Sovereignty and Subsidiarity in EU
Environmental Policy
RSC No. 96/3 
Jonathan GOLUB
State Power and Institutional Influence in 




Intégration ou désintégration? Cinq thèses 
sur l’incidence de l’intégration européenne 
sur les structures étatiques
RSC No. 96/5
Jens RASMUSSEN 
Integrating Scientific Expertise into 
Regulatory Decision-Making.
Risk Management Issues - Doing Things 
Safely with Words: Rules and Laws
RSC No. 96/6 
Olivier GODARD 
Integrating Scientific Expertise into 
Regulatory Decision-Making.
Social Decision-Making under Conditions o f  
Scientific Controversy, Expertise and the 
Precautionary Principle
RSC No. 96/7 
Robert HANKIN
Integrating Scientific Expertise into 
Regulatory Decision-Making.
The Cases o f  Food and Pharmaceuticals
RSC No. 96/8 
Ernesto PREVIDI 
Integrating Scientific Expertise into 
Regulatory Decision-Making.
L ’organisation des responsabilités publiques 
et privées dans la régulation européenne des 
risques: un vide institutionnel entre les 
deux?
RSC No. 96/9 
Josef FALKE
Integrating Scientific Expertise into 
Regulatory Decision-Making.
The Role o f  Non-governmental 
Standardization Organizations in the 




Integrating Scientific Expertise into 
Regulatory Decision-Making.
Scientific Expertise in Social Regulation and 
the European Court o f  Justice: Legal 




Integrating Scientific Expertise into
Regulatory Decision-Making.
The Frontiers o f  Science Doctrine: American 
Experiences with the Judicial Control o f  
Science-Based Decision-Making
RSC No. 96/12
Gianna BOERO/Giuseppe TULLIO 
Currency Substitution and the Stability of 
the German Demand for Money Function 
Before and After the Fall of the Berlin Wall
RSC No. 96/13
Riccardo MARSELLI/Marco VANNINI 
Estimating the Economic Model of Crime in 
the Presence of Organised Crime: Evidence 
from Italy
RSC No. 96/14 
Paul DE GRAUWE
The Economics of Convergence Towards 
Monetary Union in Europe
RSC No. 96/15
Daniel GROS
A Reconsideration of the Cost of EMU 






























































































Pierre LASCOUMES/Jérôme VALLUY 
Les activités publiques conventionnelles 
(APC): un nouvel instrument de politique 




Caste and Gender: The Violence Against 
Women in India
RSC No. 96/18 
Louis CHARPENTIER 





Institutions and Attitudes: Towards an 
Understanding of the Problem of Low 
Turnout in the European Parliament 
Elections of 1994
RSC No. 96/20
Keith BLACKBURN/Lill HANSEN 
Public Policy and Economic Growth in an 









Does Monetary Unification Lead to
Excessive Debt Accumulation?
RSC No. 96/23 
Margaret LEVI 
A State of Trust
RSC No. 96/24 
Lorenzo BINI SMAGHI 
How Can the ECB be Credible?
RSC No. 96/25
Olivier FILLEEULE
Police Records and the National Press in 




The Re-evaluation of American Citizenship
RSC No. 96/27 
Peter ROBINSON




The Seat of the European Institutions: An 




The Limits of International Organisation 
Leadership? European Crisis Management in 
the 1980s and the Inherent Tension Between 
Bilateralism and Collectivism
RSC No. 96/30 
Paul ORMEROD 
Unemployment: A Distributional 
Phenomenon
RSC No. 96/31 
Marlene WIND
Europe Towards a Post-Hobbesian Order?
A Constructivist Theory of European 
Integration (Or how to explain European 
Integration as an unintended consequence of 
rational state-action)
RSC No. 96/32 
Marlene WIND
Rediscovering Institutions: A Reflectivist 
Critique of Rational Institutionalism
RSC No. 96/33 
Evelyne RITAINE 
Hypothèses pour le sud de l’Europe: 
territoires et médiations
RSC No. 96/34
Iver B. NEUMANN 
Russia as Europe’s Other
RSC No. 96/35
Lars UUNGQVIST/Thomas J. SARGENT 
The European Unemployment Dilemma
RSC No. 96/36 
Maurizio FERRERA 
A New Social Contract?
The Four Social Europes: Between 
Universalism and Selectivity





























































































A New Social Contract?




A New Social Contract?
Le traitement de l ’intégration et de la 
marginalisation culturelle en France
RSC No. 96/39 
Paul ORMEROD 
A New Social Contract?
Unemployment in Europe
RSC No. 96/40
Karel VAN DEN BOSCH 
A New Social Contract?




A New Social Contract?




A New Social Contract?
In Defence o f  Welfare: Social Protection and 
Social Reform in Eastern Europe
RSC No. 96/43 
Martin RHODES 
A New Social Contract?
Globalisation and West European Welfare 
States
RSC No. 96/44 
Fritz SCHARPF 
A New Social Contract?
Negative and Positive Integration in the 
Political Economy o f  European Welfare 
States
RSC No. 96/45 
Bob DEACON 
A New Social Contract?
Global and Regional Agencies and the 




A New Social Contract?




A New Social Contract?
European Social Citizenship: Why a New 
Social Contract Will (Probably) Not Happen
RSC No. 96/48
Carlos CLOSA 
A New Social Contract?
EU Citizenship as the Institutional Basis o f  a 
New Social Contract: Some Sceptical 
Remarks
RSC No. 96/49 
Alexander KREHER 




The New European Agencies
The European Environment Agency and
Prospects fo r  a European Network o f
Environmental Administrations
RSC No. 96/51
Rod A. W. RHODES
The New European Agencies
Agencies in British Government: Revolution
or Evolution?
RSC No. 96/52 
Jonathan GOLUB
Why Did They Sign? Explaining EC 
Environment^ Policy Bargaining
RSC No. 96/53 
Thomas CHRISTIANSEN 
Reconstructing European Space: From 
Territorial Politics to Multilevel Governance
RSC No. 96/54 
Elisabeth PAULET
Universal Banks and the European Banking 
System: Prospects and Problems
RSC No. 96/55
Michael J. ARTIS/Wenda ZHANG
Business Cycles, Exchange Rate Regimes






























































































Walter MATTLl/Anne-Marie SLAUGHTER 
Constructing the European Community 
Legal System from the Ground Up:




Temporal Consistency and Policy 




Modelling Judicial Dialogue in the European 
Community: The Quantitative Basis of 
Preliminary References to the ECJ
RSC No. 96/59 
Alec STONE SWEET 




Deregulation, Subsidiarity and 





The Impact of the Maastricht Fiscal Criteria 
on Employment in Europe
RSC No. 96/62
Carol HARLOW
“Francovich” and the Problem of the 
Disobedient State
RSC No. 96/63 
Thomas GEHRING 
Environmental Policy in the European 
Union. Governing in Nested Institutions 
and the Case of Packaging Waste
¥  *  *
RSC No. 97/1
Donatella della PORTA/Herbert REITER 
The Policing of Mass Demonstration in 
Contemporary Democracies 
The Policing o f  Protest in Contemporary 
Democracies
RSC No. 97/2 
Robert REINER
The Policing of Mass Demonstration in 
Contemporary Democracies 




The Policing of Mass Demonstration in
Contemporary Democracies
Policing Protest in the United States: From
the 1960s to the 1990s
RSC No. 97/4
Olivier FILLIEULE/Fabien JOBARD 
The Policing of Mass Demonstration in 
Contemporary Democracies 
The Policing o f  Protest in France: Towards 
a Model o f  Protest Policing
RSC No. 97/5
Dominique WISLER/Hanspeter KRIESI 
The Policing of Mass Demonstration in 
Contemporary Democracies 
Public Order, Protest Cycles and Political 
Process: Two Swiss Cities Compared
RSC No. 97/6 
P.A.J. WADDINGTON 
The Policing of Mass Demonstration in 
Contemporary Democracies 
Controlling Protest in Contemporary, 
Historical end Comparative Perspective
RSC No. 97/7 
Herbert REITER
The Policing of Mass Demonstration in 
Contemporary Democracies 
Police and Public Order in Italy, 1944-1948. 
The Case o f  Florence
RSC No. 97/8
Oscar JAIME-JIMENEZ
The Policing of Mass Demonstration in
Contemporary Democracies
The Policing o f  Social Protest in Spain:
From Dictatorship to Democracy
RSC No. 97/9 
Martin WINTER
The Policing of Mass Demonstration in 
Contemporary Democracies 
Police Philosophy and Protest Policing in 





























































































RSC No. 97/20 
Vladimir MIKHALEV 
Poverty Alleviation in the Course of 
Transition: Policy Options for Russia
RSC No. 97/12
Patrick A. MCCARTHY




Greening the EC Regional and Cohesion
Funds. Explaining Variation Across Similar
Policy Areas
RSC No. 97/14
Richard SINNOTT/Nessa WINSTON 




Double Allegiance in European Integration:
Publics, Nation-States, and Social Policy
RSC No. 97/16
Michael J. ARTIS/Wenda ZHANG 




Zenon G. KONTOLEMIS 
Unemployment in Greece:
A Survey of the Issues
RSC No. 97/18
Olivier FILLIEULE
«Plus ga change, moins ?a change» -




Policy Networks - A New Paradigm for 
European Governance?
RSC No. 97/10 
Rocco DE BIASI
The Policing of Mass Demonstration in
Contemporary Democracies
The Policing o f Hooliganism in Italy
RSC No. 97/11
Donatella della PORTA
The Policing of Mass Demonstration in
Contemporary Democracies
Police Knowledge and Public Order:
Some Reflections on the Italian Case
'out of print
©
 T
he
 A
ut
ho
r(s
). 
Eu
ro
pe
an
 U
ni
ve
rs
ity
 In
st
itu
te
. 
D
ig
iti
se
d 
ve
rs
io
n 
pr
od
uc
ed
 b
y 
th
e 
EU
I L
ib
ra
ry
 in
 2
02
0.
 A
va
ila
bl
e 
O
pe
n 
Ac
ce
ss
 o
n 
C
ad
m
us
, E
ur
op
ea
n 
U
ni
ve
rs
ity
 In
st
itu
te
 R
es
ea
rc
h 
R
ep
os
ito
ry
.
©
 T
he
 A
ut
ho
r(s
). 
Eu
ro
pe
an
 U
ni
ve
rs
ity
 In
st
itu
te
. 
D
ig
iti
se
d 
ve
rs
io
n 
pr
od
uc
ed
 b
y 
th
e 
EU
I L
ib
ra
ry
 in
 2
02
0.
 A
va
ila
bl
e 
O
pe
n 
Ac
ce
ss
 o
n 
C
ad
m
us
, E
ur
op
ea
n 
U
ni
ve
rs
ity
 In
st
itu
te
 R
es
ea
rc
h 
R
ep
os
ito
ry
.
©
 T
he
 A
ut
ho
r(s
). 
Eu
ro
pe
an
 U
ni
ve
rs
ity
 In
st
itu
te
. 
D
ig
iti
se
d 
ve
rs
io
n 
pr
od
uc
ed
 b
y 
th
e 
EU
I L
ib
ra
ry
 in
 2
02
0.
 A
va
ila
bl
e 
O
pe
n 
Ac
ce
ss
 o
n 
C
ad
m
us
, E
ur
op
ea
n 
U
ni
ve
rs
ity
 In
st
itu
te
 R
es
ea
rc
h 
R
ep
os
ito
ry
.
©
 T
he
 A
ut
ho
r(s
). 
Eu
ro
pe
an
 U
ni
ve
rs
ity
 In
st
itu
te
. 
D
ig
iti
se
d 
ve
rs
io
n 
pr
od
uc
ed
 b
y 
th
e 
EU
I L
ib
ra
ry
 in
 2
02
0.
 A
va
ila
bl
e 
O
pe
n 
Ac
ce
ss
 o
n 
C
ad
m
us
, E
ur
op
ea
n 
U
ni
ve
rs
ity
 In
st
itu
te
 R
es
ea
rc
h 
R
ep
os
ito
ry
.
